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Chapter 1
The problem
Per year, 700,000 Europeans die from the consequences of tobacco consumption, as smoking 
causes a wide range of illnesses including various types of cancer, cardiovascular diseases and 
respiratory diseases (1). Tobacco smoke exposes an individual to more than 7,000 chemicals, 
of which 70 are known to cause damage to nearly every organ in the human body (2). Smoking 
remains one of the largest preventable causes of death in the world (3). However, on average 
26% of people in the European Union (EU) continue to smoke, with figures ranging from as low as 
7% in Sweden, to as high as 37% in Greece (1). This inconsistency between convincing evidence 
on the adverse health effects of smoking since the 1950s (4–6) and continuing smoking behavior 
can (in part) be explained by the addictive properties of tobacco.
Nicotine is an addictive substance and it is observed to be at least as addictive as cocaine or 
heroin, for example with regards to difficulties achieving abstinence (7). In the past, the tobacco 
industry has made cigarettes more addictive, by genetically modifying tobacco crops to produce 
higher levels of nicotine and adding chemicals such as ammonia to facilitate nicotine absorption 
by tobacco users (8). Despite being well-aware of the addictiveness and adverse health effects of 
smoking, CEOs of large tobacco companies have insisted under oath that they believed smoking 
was not addictive, nor related to death and disease (9). Moreover, the industry has tried to 
obscure the issue of addiction by framing tobacco consumption in terms of ‘individual choice’ 
or ‘freedom of choice’ (10), implying that smoking is a voluntary act.
Next to its detrimental effects on population health, tobacco consumption causes significant 
economic burden to society, for example in terms of high healthcare costs (e.g. chemotherapies, 
COPD treatment) and absenteeism due to illness (11). It is often argued that smoking financially 
benefits a society through state revenue from excise taxes or because citizens die prematurely 
and therefore do not enjoy their pensions, but the opposite turns out to be the case: a society 
with smokers is more expensive than a society without smokers (12).
In short: tobacco consumption is both a public health and economic problem rooted in addiction 
and sustained by a deceitful industry.
Available solutions
In many governments around the world, a shift occurred from definitely establishing the 
magnitude of the policy problem of smoking to the selection of appropriate policy solutions 
(13). It is currently widely recognized that smoking poses a public health problem, therefore 
countries now seek which policies can be enacted to address this problem (13,14). Tobacco 
control policy development in Europe is a functioning example of multilevel governance, as 
policy is developed at various levels (15).
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General introduction
The European Union provides a supranational layer of governance which imposes hard law (i.e.: 
legally binding) instruments such as Decisions, Regulations, and Directives, which all supersede 
national law (15,16). Regulations have general application, are binding in their entirety and are 
directly applicable to all EU member states (17). Decisions are also binding and directly applicable 
to Members States, but can be addressed to certain states specifically (17). In the field of tobacco 
control there have been two important directives: the Tobacco Products Directive of 2001 and 
its revision in 2015 (18–20). The 2015 directive has resulted, for example, in the graphic images 
on tobacco product packaging. Furthermore, there has been an important Tobacco Advertising 
Directive (TAD) in 2003, which regulated tobacco advertising and promotion (21).
Furthermore, the EU can propose Recommendations and Resolutions, which are non-binding 
instruments (i.e.: soft-law). These typically concern aspects of tobacco control that are the 
responsibility of the Member States, such as tobacco sales to children, which was part of a 
council recommendation in 2003 (20).
Moreover, the World Health Organization (WHO) through the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC) constitutes an additional supranational layer of governance. Although 
the FCTC is technically legally binding, there are no sanctioning devices available and can thus be 
considered a soft-law framework. As a result, countries vary considerably in their interpretation, 
implementation and enforcement of FCTC mandates (22). The FCTC is the first global public 
health treaty, which has been signed and ratified by 180 Parties world-wide, including the EU 
itself and all its member states (23). The purpose of this treaty is to ‘protect present and future 
generations from the devastating […] consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to 
tobacco smoke by providing a framework for tobacco control measures to be implemented by 
the Parties at the national, regional and international levels to reduce […] the prevalence of 
tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke’ (24). The FCTC proposes a set of policies called the 
‘MPOWER package’, which is an acronym of the following six groups of policies:
Monitor tobacco use and prevention policies,
Protect people from tobacco smoke,
Offer help to quit tobacco use,
Warn about the dangers of tobacco,
Enforce bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship and,
Raise taxes on tobacco (25).
A large-scale study in 126 countries suggested that these MPOWER policy measures are indeed 
effective, as countries with more enacted MPOWER policies experience larger reductions in 
smoking prevalence (26).
1
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Beside the European and global level, subnational levels within countries can also enact tobacco 
control policies. Subnational levels may refer to villages, cities, municipalities, provinces, 
counties, regions or federal states. Their role in tobacco control strongly depends on whether 
they are legally authorized to formulate such policies in addition to, or going beyond the policies 
formulated at the national level. In the United States, for example, states, counties and cities 
are often allowed to go beyond federal legislation in tobacco control (in other words: local law is 
often not pre-empted by federal law). This is illustrated by several states and US cities which have 
increased the legal age of sale for tobacco to 21, which is more restrictive than the federal legal 
age of sale of 18 years (27). In Germany, the federal government devolved the implementation 
of the smoking ban to the federal states, which resulted in strong variations across states in the 
way it was implemented (28). In Italy, a similar mechanism was observed as the smoking ban 
legally allowed Italian regions to go beyond national legislation, which resulted in, for example, 
a smoke free beach in Bibione (29).
A large part of the responsibility for tobacco control policy, however, still rests at the national 
level (15). Despite the fact that countries within the EU have been enacting stricter tobacco 
control measures over time, and despite strong harmonizing influences of the European 
community on tobacco control policy, there is still substantial variance in tobacco control policy 
comprehensiveness across European countries (13,30). Countries have typically responded to the 
problem of tobacco consumption in different, idiosyncratic ways, and there are significant time 
lags between acknowledgement of the problem and the emergence of effective policy measures 
to address it (14,31). Some countries have been quicker than others to comprehensively address 
the issue after the health effects became apparent, for example Finland in 1976 (32).
Countries vary considerably in terms of their tobacco control policy comprehensiveness (30,31). 
One of the most widely used benchmarking attempts to make such variations explicit for 
European countries, is through the Tobacco Control Scale (TCS) (30). The TCS has a maximum 
score of 100 and quantifies how many tobacco control policies are implemented in a given 
country. It is based on six cost effective tobacco control interventions prescribed by the World 
Bank, which are similar to the MPOWER package provided by the FCTC: price increases through 
taxes, smoke-free venues, consumer information such as through media campaigns, advertising 
bans, health warnings, and smoking cessation treatment (33). Figure 1 shows a European map 
with best, medium and worst scoring countries in terms of their score on the TCS in 2016.
In short: tobacco control policy in European countries is a functioning example of multi-level 
governance as policy is developed at multiple levels including the global, the EU, the national, 
and subnational level. There are many available effective policy options to address the problems 
that tobacco consumption poses, though both hard and soft law instruments provided by 
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General introduction
supranational organizations. Most responsibility still rests at the national level, however, and 
countries have responded in varying ways to the problems posed by tobacco consumption.
Figure 1: European map with best, medium and worst scoring countries in terms of their TCS score in 2016
 
Theories of policymaking
A rudimentary theory of policymaking could be that emergent knowledge (e.g. smoking causes 
death and disability) automatically provides the necessary pressure for policy to develop: a so-
called ‘knowledge driven model’ (14). As discussed in the previous parts, it is widely recognized 
that tobacco consumption poses a public health problem and effective policies are available. 
This could lead a somewhat naïve person - or scientist - to believe that policy enactment will 
automatically follow. Yet, this is not the case. If this had indeed been so simple, countries would 
have responded much earlier to the problems posed by tobacco consumption, probably around 
the 1960s which is roughly a decade after the first evidence on the harms of smoking emerged. 
However, policymakers rarely use evidence in such a linear, straightforward way (14). Many other 
possible factors play a role, such as values and ideology of policymakers (10), the continuous 
pressure of interest groups (34), or the economic benefits of the tobacco industry within a 
1
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country (13). Therefore, there is a need to employ more sophisticated theories of policymaking, 
which can be borrowed from political science (16).
There are various political science theories that try to explain policy change: Kingdon’s three 
streams approach (35), the theory of Punctuated Equilibrium (36), the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (37), theories on Multilevel Governance (38), theories on policy transfer (39,40), 
and others. These theories of policymaking highlight different aspects of the policy process and 
relate to different stages of the process of policymaking, but can be broken down into five broad 
core components: societal factors, the role of institutions, agenda setting/framing, interest 
groups, and the role and transfer of ideas (13). We will discuss these components one-by-one 
in the following text, with some illustrative examples.
Societal factors
Policy decisions are not made in isolation from the wider environment. Societal factors provide 
the context for policy decisions and advocacy (16). A few possible factors relevant in explaining 
differences in tobacco control policies across countries are: level of smoking prevalence, the 
economic benefits of tobacco to the national economy, and public attitudes towards smoking 
and towards tobacco control policy measures (13). These factors are typically dynamic: smoking 
prevalence in Europe generally decreases over time (1), as does the economic presence of the 
tobacco industry in terms of manufacture and productions (13). Support for future tobacco 
control policies generally increases over time (41), while public attitudes towards smoking 
become increasingly negative. These factors are often interlinked, as a decline in smoking 
prevalence corresponds to a decline in sales and concomitant decline in economic benefits to 
society (e.g.: associated jobs and income through excise taxes). Smoking prevalence is tightly 
linked to public support for tobacco control within a society as smokers are found to be less 
supportive of future tobacco control policies, as opposed to non-smokers and ex-smokers (42,43).
It must be noted that such societal factors are not inherently capable in explaining policy change, 
but they provide the context for actors to exploit opportunities (44). Tobacco control interest 
groups may try to influence certain factors, for example public support by means of mass-media 
campaigns. Tobacco control interest groups may also use high incidences of public support 
in their communication to policymakers, just like the tobacco industry may use employment 
figures from tobacco sales as a way to persuade policymakers to refrain from enacting stricter 
tobacco control policies.
The role of institutions
A common aim of any institutional approach is to link policy outcomes with one or multiple 
institutions that could influence a policy’s progress (13). Institutions may be broadly defined as 
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 13
13
General introduction
“relatively enduring features of political and social life that structure behavior and that cannot 
be changed easily or instantaneously” (45). Institutions are associated with regular patterns of 
behavior, and within institutions there are norms, practices and relationships that influence 
such regular patterns of behavior (13). A comparative focus on institutions may help explain why 
countries come to demonstrate such variance in tobacco control policies (13).
Institutions can have an effect on which interest groups have more influence on the policy 
process. When there is a short period of increased attention to a certain policy issue, institutions 
are created and/or reorganized (36). They remain in place, however, after the attention is directed 
to other issues, sustaining procedures and biases which favor one type of policy outcomes at 
the expense of other policy outcomes (36).
An example of an institutional dimension relevant in explaining tobacco control policy 
development is the centrality of the health ministry (13,46). A country’s health ministry usually 
has a public health focus on policy, as opposed to trade and treasury departments that tend to 
highlight economic aspects such as government income from excise tax and employment (46). 
When the health ministry plays a central role in policymaking, resultant policy is likely more 
comprehensive and health oriented.
Another example of a formalized institutional arrangement, is a government’s interpretation of 
FCTC’s Article 5.3, which aims to protect tobacco control policymaking from tobacco industry 
interests (24). Some countries adopted stricter interpretations of this article after the issue 
gained public and political attention. Such countries, for example, allow no contacts between 
policymakers and representatives of the tobacco industry. Other countries may have a weaker 
interpretation, for example in terms of transparency. In such cases, contacts are allowed, but 
need to be reported and publicly available.
Agenda setting/Framing
Agenda setting
Getting issues or problems on the policy agenda is the first step in the process of policymaking, 
a process which is called ‘agenda setting’ (47). After the agenda is set and the problem 
acknowledged and defined, appropriate policies need to be identified and chosen to address 
the problem, which is called the ‘policy formulation’ stage. Then, a specific policy instrument 
needs to find sufficient political and public support, which is referred to as the ‘legitimation’ 
stage. Then, the policy instrument is implemented, evaluated, and ultimately maintained or 
terminated (48).
1
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The policy agenda refers to policy issues or problems that policymakers perceive as significant 
at a certain point in time (49). The number of issues that can be on the policy agenda is limited, 
as it is impossible for policymakers to consider all issues that confront a society simultaneously 
(50). Sometimes a crisis can ‘catapult’ an issue on the policy agenda, such as was the case during 
the European ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 (51). In other cases, the policy agenda may be set by policy 
participants that have an interest in specific policy outcomes, such as public health or industry 
interest groups. These groups typically compete to get their policy issues on the agenda, or in 
the case of the tobacco industry: keep the issue off the agenda (47,52).
Venue shopping
Policy participants can try multiple venues to address a problem or define policy problems, such 
as government, the media, or the judiciary. This is a phenomenon called ‘venue shopping’ (53). As 
an example: in the Netherlands, a public criminal case against the tobacco industry by the Youth 
Smoking Prevention Foundation (Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd) triggered a wave of publicity 
and attention. The tobacco industry was accused of misleading consumers by puncturing holes 
in cigarette filters in such a way that official measurement machinery indicates lower tar and 
nicotine levels than smokers actually inhale (54). The judiciary and the media in this case provided 
alternative venues to focus on the tobacco industry as being unreliable and deceitful, which 
ultimately also resulted in questions in parliament (55).
Framing
Even when an issue finally does get attention, interest groups continue to compete to ensure 
that their depiction (i.e.: frame) of the issue remains in the forefront (47). The group that can 
successfully frame a problem, will be the one to define the solutions and by doing so, prevail in 
the policy debate (14,56). By framing an issue, groups create a narrative of a policy problem which 
is both diagnostic and prescriptive: they indicate what is wrong, and how it needs to be fixed (57).
In tobacco control, proponents and opponents persistently struggle to frame tobacco in different 
ways, focusing on different dimensions of tobacco consumption, which is a multi-dimensional 
policy problem (58,59). These dimensions allow for numerous possible ways to frame the policy 
issue. This can be done in terms of adverse health effects, vulnerable groups (such as children 
or citizens with low socio-economic status), economic burden to society, impacts on associated 
jobs, state revenue from excise taxes, individual freedom, et cetera. The way an issue is framed 
can ultimately have an impact on the way resources are allocated (i.e.: on which policy solutions 
public money is spent).
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 15
15
General introduction
Interest groups
Advocacy by interest groups is important in explaining tobacco control policy development 
(58), as more comprehensive regulations are typically attributed to health NGOs, and weaker or 
avoided regulations are often attributed to the tobacco industry (60–65). Research on tobacco 
control policy increasingly focuses on interest groups, as is illustrated by the emergence of 
theories that focus on their role in the policy process, such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) and the theory of Punctuated Equilibrium (53,66).
According to the ACF, coalitions are structured around a central belief (e.g. smoking is bad for 
health) and these incorporate actors from civil society, the media and government (37). Shared 
beliefs are the ‘glue’ that bind these actors together in advocacy coalitions, and they engage in 
coordinated activity over time (37).
The Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium states that long periods of policy stability are alternated 
by short and important changes in policy, which are called ‘punctuated equilibria’ (53). Here, 
groups are assumed to have a ‘policy monopoly’ which has two elements: a monopoly on 
political understandings of the policy issue (reflected by the dominant frame) and institutional 
arrangements that reinforce such policy monopolies (67).
The previous section described that the dominant interest group typically prevails in framing 
both the policy problem and proposing policy solutions. The tobacco industry may deny or 
downplay the size of the problem, and propose weaker, non-intrusive policy measures such 
as education, as opposed to more intrusive legislative measures such as bans which are often 
proposed by health groups (68).
A shift in the relative power of interest groups is generally apparent over time. In earlier days, 
the tobacco industry typically had a larger influence on policy agendas (1). This was in times 
where large proportions of the population smoked and health effects remained largely unknown. 
When health effects did become apparent, health groups began to advocate for the enactment 
of stricter tobacco control policies.
The role and transfer of ideas
Scholars that focus on the role of ideas in the process of policymaking use terms such as policy 
diffusion, lesson drawing, policy borrowing, policy transfer, policy emulation and policy copying. 
Although distinctions can be made between these terms, they all refer to a “process by which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political 
system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in another political system” (40).
1
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Smith (2015) refers to three levels of ideas commonly identified in political science: policy 
paradigms, policy frames, and policy solutions (14). Whereas policy paradigms refer to 
overarching ways of thinking about the world (e.g. left versus right wing political preference), 
policy frames refer to ideas that help define what is, and what is not considered a policy 
problem (e.g. increasing differences in smoking status between high and low SES individuals 
are problematic and should be addressed), and policy solutions refers to particular policy 
instruments (e.g. a ban on tobacco vending machines) (14). Within the policy transfer literature, 
‘ideas’ are commonly operationalized as policy instruments (69).
Ideas that spread like a virus
Ideas can ‘spread like a virus’ and in tobacco control this is no exception (31). Tobacco control 
itself can be seen as a virus-like ‘idea whose time has come’, as it becomes more and more 
conventional for governments to act upon the ever-mounting evidence of the problems caused 
by tobacco consumption and the effectiveness of the various policy solutions (70). Besides 
tobacco control itself, emerging evidence on the harms of passive smoking since the end of the 
1980s has caused a spread in the development and enactment of smoke-free policies over the 
following decades (70,71). Public health interest groups could make the claim that smoking is 
not merely an individual choice harming only the health of the smoker, but also a choice that 
could harm the health of a non-smoker. In a similar vein, the idea of tobacco as an addictive drug 
spread in the course of the 1990s. Before that, it was more readily considered a dependence or 
even more euphemistically as ‘a bad habit’ (72).
This thesis
Added value of this thesis
In the scientific tobacco control literature, most research comes from the medical, public health 
or behavioral sciences, less from public policy or political science (16,73,75). Publications in 
tobacco control are dominated by studies on smoking and health (75). When tobacco control 
policies are examined, studies usually focus on the impacts of tobacco control policies, and less 
on what determines tobacco control policy adoption. The tobacco control policy process remains 
understudied, perhaps because policymaking is considered complex or abstract (76).
When scholars do investigate the policy process, they often conduct single country case studies 
over time (31). These case studies are informative if a person wants to know more about the 
situation within a specific country. It may offer limited theoretical insights, however, as results are 
very much bound to the context of a single country (31). A cross-country comparative approach 
has the potential to discover variables that are necessarily treated as constants in single country 
case studies, such as strength of the tobacco industry in terms of manufacture and production 
(77). However, cross-national comparative research comparing more than two countries is rarely 
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conducted (31,77). The reason for this may be because it is a substantial challenge to group 
countries into explanatory clusters, as this sometimes involves (crude) classifications (31). Single 
country case studies do not need to make such classifications. As such, they can do justice to the 
complexity and idiosyncrasy of the process of policymaking in a certain country. The potential 
to reach general conclusions is however far greater with a cross-country comparative approach 
(31). This thesis will try to fill this knowledge gap by investigating the determinants of tobacco 
control policymaking, employing when possible a cross-national approach comparing various 
European countries.
Aims of this thesis
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine what underlies the considerable variations in tobacco 
control policy comprehensiveness across European countries. In the first part, we will focus on 
public support, framing, interest groups, institutions, and policy learning.
In the second part of this thesis, we zoom in on one of these determinants: tobacco control 
partnerships. This approach was chosen after data that emerged from the first part suggested 
that there is considerable room for improvement of the way the tobacco control community is 
organized. This is a determinant which can be changed and improved, yet it has been scantly 
researched (78).
Two specific aims will be addressed:
1. To examine determinants of tobacco control policymaking in European countries
2. To examine which characteristics are related to tobacco control partnership strength 
and how European partnerships compare with regards to these characteristics.
Outline of this thesis
Part 1: determinants of tobacco control policymaking in European countries
Part 1 consists of four chapters aimed to understand various determinants of tobacco control 
policymaking in European countries. Chapter 2 reviews what is known about determinants of 
the policy processes regarding three youth access and exposure policies: raising the age of 
sale, banning tobacco displays at points of sale, and limiting the number and type of tobacco 
outlets. Chapter 3 examines the importance of framing, by examining how public support, one 
of the determinants of policymaking, relates to support for the protection of children against 
tobacco. Studies in Chapter 4 and 5 compare various European countries and are based on expert 
interviews conducted across Europe. Chapter 4 examines the relative power balance of pro and 
anti-tobacco control interest groups by looking at framing and institutional arrangements across 
6 European countries. Chapter 5 examines policy learning in 5 European countries by looking at 
considerations to accept or dismiss foreign examples in tobacco control.
1
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Part 2: characteristics associated with tobacco control partnership strength
Part 2 consists of two chapters presenting the results of our research aimed to discover which 
characteristics contribute to tobacco control partnership strength, and to develop a tool to 
measure the prevalence of such characteristics. Chapter 6 draws from an expert panel to 
identify characteristics associated with tobacco control partnership strength. Chapter 7 is 
dedicated to the development and application of a tool to systematically assess the prevalence 
of characteristics associated with partnership strength across European countries.
General discussion
The general discussion of this thesis provides an overview and interpretation of the main 
findings followed by a discussion on theoretical and methodological considerations including 
generalizability. Implications for science and practice are discussed as well.
Data sources and methodology
Table 1 provides an overview of the data sources, methods, and setting per chapter.
Table 1. Overview of chapters and study characteristics
Chapter Data source Method Setting
Part 1
Chapter 2 Literature review Realist inspired review -
Chapter 3 Dutch Cancer Society 
(KWF) survey data
Quantitative, cross-sectional The Netherlands
Chapter 4 Interview data Qualitative, framework
method
6 European countries
Chapter 5 Interview data Qualitative, bottom-up thematic 
analysis
5 European countries
Part 2
Chapter 6 Expert panel data Qualitative, bottom-up thematic 
analysis
10 European countries
Chapter 7 Expert panel data, pilot 
test data, survey data
Quantitative, descriptive EU28 + Norway and 
Switzerland
Methodology
The methodology in this thesis has two main characteristics: it is predominantly qualitative and 
realist-inspired.
First, a qualitative approach was needed, as we tried to answer the question why tobacco 
control policy development differs from country to country. Qualitative research is best suited 
to understand social phenomena from the perspectives of the (policy) actors themselves (79). 
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As we study policy processes, the policy actors within policy domains have most detailed 
knowledge about these processes, as they concern them in their daily lives. There are quantitative 
studies investigating variations in tobacco control across countries, yet such studies can only 
establish a correlation between variables, and not how or why such variables are related (80). 
Establishing a significant correlation between Y and Z does not offer an explanatory model of how 
Z is influenced by Y. Qualitative research has the potential to identify such explanatory models.
A ‘realist inspired’ approach as adopted in this thesis, refers to an approach which focuses 
precisely on such ‘inner workings’ or ‘mechanisms’ of phenomena such as tobacco control 
policymaking (81). The realist methodology aims to explain how things work: taking a look into 
the ‘black box’ of policymaking (81). Realist approaches take into account the context, which 
is needed for a cross-country study on policymaking. It aims to explain how the context (the 
country), the mechanism (how policymaking works), and the outcome (comprehensive tobacco 
control policy) interrelate (81).
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ABSTRACT
Background: Policymakers can adopt and implement various supply-side policies to limit youth 
access and exposure to tobacco, such as increasing the minimum age of sale, limiting the number 
or type of tobacco outlets, or banning the display of tobacco products. Many studies have 
assessed the impact of these policies, while less is known about the preceding policy process. 
The aim of our review was to assess the available evidence on the preceding process of agenda 
setting, policy formulation, and policy legitimation.
Methods: A systematic literature search was conducted using the PubMed and the Social 
Sciences Citation Index databases. After selection, 200 international peer-reviewed articles 
were identified and analyzed. Through a process of close reading, evidence based on scientific 
enquiry and anecdotal evidence on agenda setting, policy formulation and policy legitimation 
was abstracted from each article.
Results: Scientific evidence on the policy process is scarce for these policies, as most of the 
evidence found was anecdotal. Only one study provided evidence based on a scientific analysis 
of data on the agenda setting and legitimation phases of policy processes that led to the adoption 
of display bans in two Australian jurisdictions.
Conclusion: The processes influencing the adoption of youth access and exposure policies 
have been grossly understudied. A better understanding of the policy process is essential to 
understand country variations in tobacco control policy.
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 31
31
Literature review
INTRODUCTION
Youth smoking continues to be a widespread public health problem. Globally, an estimated 7.0% 
of children aged 13-15 smoke; the Americas (13.0%) and the European region (9.8%) demonstrate 
the highest prevalence of smoking among children (1). Youth smoking can be prevented in various 
ways. One of the strategies is to reduce youth access to tobacco products. The policy most often 
used to achieve this reduction of access is raising the minimum age-of-sale for the purchase of 
tobacco. Most countries have implemented this policy, in line with the recommendations of 
Article 16 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which aims to reduce sales 
to and by minors (2). Reviews examining the effectiveness of age-of-sale policies report mixed 
and inconclusive findings and urge the consideration of enforcement conditions and personal 
characteristics (3–7). A reduction in illegal sales to minors does not necessarily mean that youth 
tobacco consumption is also decreased, because minors can often still access tobacco through 
social sources (8). This is one of the reasons some authors have concluded that age-of-sale 
policies are ineffective (9). Others conclude that such policies may be effective, as long as they 
are well enforced (10).
Youth access to tobacco may also be reduced by limiting the number or type of tobacco outlets. 
Tobacco retailing throughout the world is completely normalized, and “tobacco can be sold 
openly, from virtually any business” (11). Policy measures directly limiting the number of tobacco 
outlets, for example, specialized shops, have rarely been adopted. Thus far, only the Hungarian 
government has done so, substantially reducing the number of outlets from 42,000 to 7,000, with 
the explicit aim to decrease smoking prevalence (12). It can be argued from the perspective of 
economic theory that a higher tobacco retail density leads to increased tobacco consumption due 
to increased availability and reduced retrieval costs (13). However, because policies that reduce 
the number of sale outlets are rarely adopted, there is limited data on their effectiveness. Some, 
but not all, studies on this subject have reported positive associations between tobacco outlet 
density and smoking behavior (14–16). However, because the studies all used observational 
research designs, causality cannot be inferred (17).
Next to increasing the age of sale and limiting the absolute number of outlets, policymakers may 
choose to ban the sale of tobacco from certain types of retail outlets. Sale restrictions may be 
related to the primary function of the sale outlet, which can be in conflict with tobacco sales, 
such as in the case of pharmacies (18). Another option is a ban on tobacco vending machines, 
which may offer easy access of tobacco to minors. To address this issue, Article 16 of the FCTC 
recommends putting into place a ban on vending machines, or at least some restrictions on 
accessibility (2). Many countries have addressed this issue; a total of 89 countries worldwide 
now have a ban on tobacco vending machines (19).
2
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Directly limiting the number of tobacco retailers may be a step too far for policymakers, which 
is perhaps indicated by the small number of countries that have adopted this policy measure 
thus far. An alternative option for policymakers may be to consider banning tobacco displays 
at points of sale, which will not reduce physical access but aims to reduce exposure to pro-
smoking messages at points of sale. Studies and reviews have demonstrated positive associations 
between exposure to tobacco displays and youth smoking behavior and susceptibility (20–24). 
A growing number of countries have adopted a display ban (22,25,26), and evaluations of the 
countries that have implemented this ban suggest that it helps to denormalize smoking (27–29).
While there is an emerging body of literature on the effectiveness of the various policies that 
limit youth access and exposure to tobacco, less is known about the preceding policy process 
that leads to their adoption by policymakers. In fact, most public health research is carried out 
without considering the policy process at all (30). Public health advocates and professionals 
who want to effectively use the political arena need to have at least a basic understanding of 
how policymaking works (31). The more thoroughly this process is examined, the better these 
individuals can anticipate constraints and opportunities for policy change (32).
There are several theories that may be used to study the preceding process of policymaking 
up until policy adoption, such as Kingdon’s three streams (33), the punctuated equilibrium 
theory (34), the advocacy coalition framework (35), theories on multilevel governance (36), 
theories on policy transfer (37,38) and others. These theories focus on different aspects of 
the policymaking process, which are relevant to different stages of the policymaking process. 
Cairney (39) breaks down the policy process into the following six stages: agenda setting, policy 
formulation, legitimation, implementation, evaluation, and policy maintenance, succession or 
termination. In the current paper, we are interested in the first three stages, as these are relevant 
to the adoption of policies. Agenda setting refers to the identification of policy problems (e.g., 
a high level of youth smoking). Formulation refers to the selection of appropriate solutions for 
the policy problem (e.g., an age-of-sale policy). Legitimation refers to ensuring that the chosen 
policy has enough political and public support. While much is known about the impacts of policy, 
considerably less is known about its antecedents (40). A better insight into the stages up until 
policy adoption is of vital importance for advocates that wish to foster tobacco control policy.
The aim of this paper is to assess the scientific evidence on the first three stages of the 
policymaking process of raising the legal age for the purchase of tobacco, limiting the number 
or type of tobacco outlets, and banning tobacco displays at points of retail. We will assess the 
quantity and quality of the evidence that can be found in the international scientific literature.
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METHODS
We conducted a literature search to find evidence on the agenda setting, policy formulation 
and policy legitimation stages of the policy cycle for the three policies under study. The search 
strategy was informed by a quick scan of the literature and by a priori inspection of the case of 
the Netherlands. In this preparatory step, we examined Dutch parliamentary documents about 
the emergence of tobacco control legislation from 1995 onwards. In addition, we interviewed 
a member of parliament, a civil servant, and an academic expert, and questions were sent by 
e-mail to international tobacco control experts. These sources provided us with relevant insights 
into the policymaking process of the three policies. We translated this knowledge into keywords 
for our search strategy.
We conducted a literature search using the PubMed and Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) 
databases. Whereas the first database predominantly covers biomedical journals, the SSCI 
covers a wide range of 176 political science journals. We searched for articles published in peer-
reviewed journals up to March 2016. We set no publication date requirement for the articles to 
be included because countries differed in the timing of policy adoption.
Screening
The search yielded 507 references to international peer-reviewed articles. After removing 145 
duplicates, 362 articles remained for title and abstract screening. The selection of studies was 
performed in two stages by two reviewers: TGK and Paulien Nuyts (a project member). During 
the first selection stage, the titles and abstracts of the selected studies were screened by both 
reviewers to select appropriate studies for full text screening. During the second stage, the 
full texts were assessed to abstract relevant evidence about the first three stages of the policy 
process. Because of limited time, the full-text screening was completed by TGK after a random 
sample of 20 articles (10%) had been screened by both reviewers to test and fine tune the 
eligibility criteria, as well as to ensure consensus.
The title and abstract screening criteria were as follows: an article should 1) be written in English, 
2) have a full text available and 3) concern one of the three policies of interest (i.e., raising the 
age of sale, limiting the number or type of sale outlets and banning tobacco displays) or broader 
topics such as youth access/availability. A total of 138 articles were not related to any of the 
three selected policies, 15 articles had no full text available, and 9 articles were not written in 
English. We checked whether the non-English articles mainly focused on the first three stages 
of the policymaking process by reading the English abstracts, and concluded this was not the 
case. The remaining 200 articles were analyzed to determine whether they presented evidence 
on any of the first three stages of the policymaking process (see data extraction below).
2
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Figure 1: PRISM flowchart diagram of included articles
Data extraction
Because this review is realist inspired, we followed the Realist And Meta-narrative Evidence 
Synthesis: Evolving Standards (RAMESES) guidelines for data extraction and appraisal (41). Both 
reviewers appraised the contribution of evidence in terms of both rigor and relevance. In terms 
of rigor (i.e., judging the credibility and trustworthiness of evidence), a dichotomy was made 
between “anecdotal evidence,” such as author accounts in the introduction and discussion 
sections (which could be considered “thin” evidence), and evidence resulting from scientific 
analyses employing a scientific method (which could be considered “thick” evidence). Evidence 
was considered relevant if it explicitly described a causal link between a certain determinant 
and the adoption one of the three selected policies (e.g., the enactment of a ban on vending 
machines in response to the federal Synar Amendment of the United States).
Subsequently, the 200 articles were assessed by the first author alone. Evidence was deemed 
relevant if it met the following eligibility criteria referring to the first three stages of the policy 
process: 1) agenda setting: the paper provides information on the process of acknowledging an 
issue as a policy problem 2) policy formulation: the paper provides information on the process 
of formulating a policy in response to a problem, and 3) policy legitimation: the paper provides 
information on the process of legitimating the choice for a specific type of policy. We further 
extracted the title of the article, the full names of the authors, the year of publication, the 
main focus of the article (“Agenda setting/policy formulation/legitimation”, “Enforcement/
compliance”, “Effectiveness of policy”, “Industry misconduct” or “Other”) and the policy measure 
the evidence was related to (“Raising the age of Sale”, “Limiting number or type of tobacco 
outlets” or “Banning tobacco displays”).
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RESULTS
We found 74 pieces of evidence in 53 articles that were related to one or more of the three policy 
stages of interest. Fifty-two pieces of evidence were related to raising the age of sale, 15 were 
related to limiting the number or type of tobacco outlets, and 7 were related to banning tobacco 
displays. One article offered a systematic analysis of data, whereas the other 52 articles gave 
anecdotal author accounts. A summary of the findings for each policy can be found in Table 1.
Raising the age of sale
All evidence about the age-of-sale policies was anecdotal and found in articles that focused 
on a different topic than agenda setting, policy formulation and/or legitimation (Table 1). 
Thirty pieces of evidence were found in articles that had enforcement/compliance (n = 13) or 
effectiveness of the policy (n = 17) as the main focus. Much of this evidence was from papers 
on the implementation of the federal Synar Amendment of the United States, in which the 
authors commented on the adoption of age-of-sale policies by individual states in response 
to this amendment. Seventeen pieces of evidence about age-of-sale policies were found in 
articles with a main  focus on industry misconduct, in which the authors commented on how the 
industry promoted voluntary agreements as alternative policy solutions. The authors referred to 
these agreements as ineffective by design and noted that they were intended to ward off more 
comprehensive and effective legislation.
Limiting the number or type of tobacco outlets
Fifteen pieces of evidence were found that concerned limiting the number or type of tobacco 
outlets. Again, no evidence was found in articles that had agenda setting, policy formulation 
and/or legitimation as the main focus. Most pieces of evidence focused on the enforcement 
of and compliance with the policy (n = 4) or the effectiveness of the policy (n = 5). The pieces 
of evidence were all anecdotal, meaning that they were not found in the results section of the 
article and were not based on a systematic analysis of data.
Banning tobacco displays
We found seven pieces of evidence related to banning tobacco displays. Five of these came 
from one paper (42). This was the only article in our database that focused on the first stages 
of the policy cycle and that offered a systematic analysis of data concerning the policymaking 
process. These authors examined the adoption of display bans in two Australian jurisdictions. The 
empirical analysis showed how the ban was legitimized by framing it in terms of youth prevention 
and combining the ban with other policy measures, thus generating strong public support for 
these measures. Furthermore, presenting the ban as a natural extension of existing advertising 
bans increased its attractiveness to policymakers. Evidence was also presented regarding the 
2
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agenda setting phase, which described how a widely accepted and highly compelling evidence 
base about tobacco control interventions in general created a favorable political environment. 
This environment enabled the passage of a tobacco display ban without an explicit prior analysis 
of scientific evidence in support of the ban (42). The remaining two pieces of evidence were 
anecdotal and described the FCTC, endgame strategies and their agenda setting functions.
Table 1: Pieces of evidence by policy and main focus of article
Raising age of sale Limiting number  
or type of  
tobacco outlets
Banning tobacco 
displays
Total
Main research focus of article
Agenda setting /formulation/
legitimation
0 0 5(42) 5
Enforcement/compliance 13(43–55) 4(51,84,85) 0 17
Effectiveness of policy 17(9,56–70) 5(64,86–88) 1(22) 23
Industry misconduct 17(71–79) 2(76,89) 0 19
Other 5(80–83) 4(81,90,91) 1(92) 10
Total pieces of evidence 52 15 7 74
Distribution across time
Figure 2 presents boxplots of the distribution across time of the publication of the identified 
pieces of evidence regarding the three policy measures. The evidence on the policy process 
of the two youth access policies was published prior to evidence on the policy process of the 
display bans.
Figure 2: Dispersion of published evidence across time
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DISCUSSION
Our study showed that scientific, systematic evidence on the first stages of the policy process 
is scarce for the three policies under study. Most evidence was anecdotal, i.e., restricted to 
incidental observations presented as accounts of the authors. We were able to identify only 
one study that presented systematic scientific evidence on the policy process (42). This study 
provided evidence on the agenda setting and legitimation phases of policy processes that 
ultimately resulted in the adoption of display bans in two Australian jurisdictions (42).
These findings support the general claim of Clavier et al. (30) that the policymaking process 
is understudied in the health promotion field, at least as far as youth prevention policies in 
the field of tobacco control are concerned. Scholars often study what happens after a policy 
has been adopted (e.g., the implementation, evaluation and policy maintenance stages). The 
predominance of this late-stage focus is illustrated by our finding that most pieces of anecdotal 
evidence that we found regarding the early phases of the policy process were identified in papers 
that mainly focused on later stages of the process (e.g., evaluation and policy maintenance).
Why are the initial phases of the policy process understudied in research on policies to limit 
youth access and exposure to tobacco? The answer might be that public health scientists consider 
policymaking to be an abstract construct that is best left to the domain of politics (93). De 
Leeuw et al. (93) remark that only a few health promotion scholars are trained in the political 
sciences. The interest of researchers trained in health promotion or public health may not lie 
in the ‘obscure’ and hard-to-grasp process of policymaking. Moreover, researchers who are 
trained in the behavioral or psychological sciences may be more inclined to study the behavior 
of individuals in response to a certain tobacco control policy. Tobacco control policies may then 
be merely considered distal determinants of health (93).
In describing the relationship between science and policymaking, Larsen (94) argues that the 
tobacco control research literature can be classified into two broad categories: a science-
driven body and a policy-driven one. Research in the science-driven category often concludes 
that policymakers should base their policies on scientific findings, which are considered to be 
immediate and sufficient causes for the formulation of policies. Smith (95) makes a similar claim 
in the wider domain of public health policy by describing a “knowledge-driven model” in which 
research findings are assumed to provide the necessary pressure for policy to develop. Politics 
are then merely seen as a “barrier”, which science must overcome. The second body of tobacco 
control research, Larsen (94) claims, is smaller in size and regards scientific findings as one 
among many factors that influence policymakers’ decisions. This category typically focuses on 
the dynamics and institutional surroundings of public policy.
2
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 38
38
Chapter 2
It seems that most literature that we found could be grouped into the first category (i.e., the 
science- or knowledge-driven body of literature), which is often reflected by normative comments 
in the discussion sections in which authors conclude that policymakers should consider scientific 
evidence about effectiveness to base policymaking decisions on. However, without rigorous 
scientific assessment of the first stages, it remains uncertain how the outcomes of studies on 
effectiveness, enforcement or compliance could be relevant to policymaking in these initial 
phases. Whereas advocates stress the importance of evidence in their work and define it as 
being central to their advocacy, politicians and political advisors may be more inclined to listen 
to economic and ideological arguments in governmental debates (96).
A possible limitation of this study was that, due to time and resource constraints, the full-
text screening of the 200 articles was performed by one individual. Full-text screening by two 
individuals may have resulted in slightly more or fewer abstracted anecdotal pieces of evidence. 
However, the main conclusion of our study remains valid: there is only one article that focuses 
on the first three stages of the policy process.
If we want to understand the substantial variation in tobacco control policy adoption across 
different countries (97), we need to gain more insight into the first phases of the policy process. 
Many ideas circulate about what causes this variation in policy adoption; however, there is barely 
any scientific evidence on why policy processes have led  to such different outcomes in different 
countries. Moreover, a better understanding of such processes may be of crucial importance for 
tobacco control advocates to work more effectively.
CONCLUSION
The processes influencing the adoption of youth access and exposure policies have been grossly 
understudied. We identified only one study that systematically examined the first stages of the 
policy process of tobacco display bans in two Australian jurisdictions. Aside from the evidence 
resulting from this study, which was based on a scientific analysis of data, all other evidence we 
found was merely anecdotal and restricted to author accounts. We therefore call on researchers 
to devote more attention to the initial phases of the policy process of youth prevention policies 
in tobacco control. Specifically, this means systematic empirical research that employs existing 
theories on the process of policymaking (33–38) and that utilizes, when possible, a comparative 
approach. A better understanding of these three first phases as they are relevant to policy 
adoption is essential to understand country variations in tobacco control policy and to help 
tobacco control advocates use the political arena more effectively.
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ABSTRACT
Introduction: In many countries, health advocates aim to increase public support for tobacco 
control policies by framing these policies in terms of child protection. We examined whether 
support for the protection of children is indeed associated with support for tobacco control 
policies, even among smokers, opponents of state intervention and opponents of a governmental 
role in tobacco control.
Methods: We used a survey on a representative sample of Dutch adults of 18 years and older 
(n=1,631). The survey measured respondents’ support for banning tobacco displays, raising the 
age of sale for tobacco to 21 years and limiting tobacco sales to specialized shops. Regression 
analyses were done to assess the association with respondents’ support for the protection of 
children against tobacco. In further analyses, subgroup interactions were added.
Results: Respondents’ support for the protection of children against tobacco with legislation 
was positively related to support for all three policies. Associations were weaker for smokers 
(except for raising the age) but similar for opponents of state intervention and opponents of a 
governmental role in tobacco control.
Conclusion: This is the first paper to empirically support the idea that emphasizing the need 
to protect children against tobacco enhances support for tobacco control policies. This ‘child 
effect’ is effective in all segments of the population, albeit somewhat weaker among smokers.
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INTRODUCTION
Most social scientists acknowledge the association between public opinion and public policy 
(1). This so called ‘policy responsiveness’ has been established in the domain of tobacco control 
in a variety of European countries and US states, where smoke-free legislation was found to 
follow public preferences (2–4). Public policies are a major determinant of public health (5) and 
are therefore crucial in addressing smoking induced diseases and morbidity. According to the 
WHO’s Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) public policies that are unpopular may 
‘need to be altered or reframed with better advocacy and communication strategies’ (6). How 
a policy is described or ‘framed’ can ‘determine the extent to which it has popular or political 
support’ and the language used shapes the way people come to think about it (7). Framing can 
be understood as narratives that are both diagnostic and prescriptive: per policy these narratives 
tell what needs to be changed or improved, and how this may be addressed (8).
A frame used by many tobacco control organizations, is the protection of children against tobacco 
(9,10). There are some indications from the literature that a child-frame is related to support for 
prospective tobacco control policies. Scholars have observed that tobacco control policy support 
is higher for policies that explicitly target children (11), that policymakers purposefully use a 
child-frame in opinion polls to yield high public support for a tobacco display ban (12,13) and 
that reducing youth opportunities to smoke and establishing positive role models for children 
are reasons to support smoke-free parks (14). However, scholars have not yet empirically tested 
this ‘child-effect’ and how it relates to tobacco control policy support among the general public. 
In order to better understand how these two concepts are related, we examine how people’s 
support for the protection of children is related to their support for three prospective tobacco 
control retail policies: banning tobacco displays at point of sale, raising the age of sale to 21 and 
limiting sales to specialized shops. These supply-side policies are regarded as logical next steps 
in tobacco control efforts and are thus far only adopted by a few progressive countries and US 
states and cities (15–17). Moreover, these policies can readily be framed with the aim to prevent 
youth access and exposure to tobacco products.
The degree of policy support differs for different segments of the population. Smoking status is 
found to be related to tobacco control policy support, as smokers generally demonstrate less 
support for tobacco control policies than non-smokers (18–22). Even though support for tobacco 
control policies has been found to be much lower among smokers, smokers may support policies 
more if they think children should be protected against tobacco.
Next to smoking status, having certain ideological views may be of influence on support for 
tobacco control policies. It has been demonstrated that such views are of influence on the level 
3
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of support for tobacco control policies, but it was also noted that using a simplified left-right 
wing preference scale may not reflect more nuanced ideological beliefs (23). In this paper we use 
ideological dimensions that go beyond the left-right wing divide and measure beliefs about state 
intervention and beliefs about the proper role of government in relation to tobacco control. We 
expect less support from individuals that oppose state intervention since opponents of tobacco 
control policies typically argue that the government should not interfere with the private lives of 
citizens and that citizens are themselves responsible for their choices and actions (24). However, 
possibly, opponents of state intervention might as well support tobacco control policies when 
they think children should be protected against tobacco.
Some scholars argue that a distinction can be made between symbolic and operational political 
ideology (25). Whereas the former aspect of ideology is largely understood in terms of self-
identification in which respondents identify themselves as being liberal or right-wing, the latter 
aspect of ideology is more specific and issue-based (25). There have been cases where individuals 
were identified as being conservative, yet were in favor of specific ‘big government’ policies, 
which was incongruent (26). Since tobacco has unique product features, such as its addictiveness 
and severe health consequences (27), it may well be the case that individuals who oppose general 
state intervention, may still support governmental intervention with regard to tobacco control. 
Therefore, we also assess specific, issue-based ideological beliefs: opposition to a governmental 
role in tobacco control. Furthermore, we assess whether individuals having such beliefs will 
be more supportive of tobacco control policies when they think children should be protected.
The aim of this study is two-fold: first, we test whether support for the protection of children 
is positively associated with support for three prospective tobacco control policies. Second, we 
assess whether this association works as well within groups that are expected to have less policy 
support: smokers, opponents of state intervention in general and opponents of a governmental 
role in tobacco control.
METHODS
Data
The data were derived from a Dutch public opinion poll, commissioned by the Dutch Cancer 
Society and collected by Kantar Public. The sample was drawn from an online panel which consists 
of more than 120,000 respondents who participate in survey research on a regular basis. Panel 
members are actively recruited by Kantar Public in case a certain group is underrepresented. 
A total number of 2,535 stratified invitations were sent and 1,631 respondents participated, 
which resulted in a response rate of 64%. After the final sample was obtained, a small correction 
was applied by means of regression weights based on population characteristics (gender, age, 
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education, family size, social class, wealth, region, and smoking status) derived from a national 
calibration instrument developed in collaboration with Statistics Netherlands. This instrument 
is used by market agencies and research departments in order to obtain representative regional 
and national samples (28). Respondents filled in the online questionnaire between March 28 and 
April 6 2014 in exchange for saving points worth €2,55 which could later be exchanged for gift 
certificates. Only fully completed questionnaires were used to compile the database so there 
were no missing values.
Measures
The dependent variables were support for three prospective tobacco control policies. Support 
for banning tobacco displays at point of sale was measured with the item “In order to minimize 
the advertising of tobacco products, these items should not be displayed visually in the store”, 
support for raising the age of sale to 21 was measured by asking “To what extent would you 
agree if tobacco products in the Netherlands can only be sold to people aged 21 and over?” 
and support for limiting sales to specialized shops with “Tobacco items should only be sold at 
tobacco retail stores”. 5-point Likert scales were used ranging from 1 “Completely disagree” to 
5 “Completely agree”.
As predictor for policy support, we used a variable measuring support for the protection of 
children against tobacco: “Suppose legislation is possible to ensure that (your) children never start 
smoking. To what extent would you agree?” This item was measured with a 5 point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 “Completely disagree” to 5 “Completely agree”. Because this variable is ordinal, 
the answer categories were converted into five dichotomous variables with a 0/1 coding (dummy 
variables) and added to the model with the first answer category as reference.
Smoking status was operationalized using a dichotomous variable: “Do you (ever) smoke, or do 
you not smoke at all?” (Non-smoker=0, Smoker=1).
Opposition to state intervention in general was operationalized with an item adopted from the 
European Values Study (29) and added to the 2014 public opinion poll. This item ranged from 
the proposition “Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves” to the 
proposition “The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” 
on a 10-point scale. It was reversed so that a higher score indicates more opposition to state 
intervention.
Opposition to a governmental role in tobacco control was operationalized as a mean score 
out of three items (α=.74): “The government should not take any action at all in the field of 
smoking “; “The government must inform the public about the effects of smoking (reversed)” “The 
3
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government must take measures to reduce smoking (reversed)”. These items were all measured 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Completely disagree” to 5 “Completely agree”. A mean 
score was computed and a higher score indicates more opposition to a governmental role in 
tobacco control.
The correlation of opposition to state intervention in general and opposition to a governmental 
role in tobacco control was reasonably low (r=.04), suggesting discriminant validity of the 
concepts.
The “I don’t know” answer categories (6) were recoded as “Not agree, not disagree” (3). This was 
done because we wanted to keep the sample representative of the Dutch population. The item 
with highest percentage of “I don’t know” was support for the protection of children against 
tobacco (5.2%).
Demographic covariates included were gender (Male=0, Female=1), socio-economic status 
(based on education and income on a five point scale with higher scores indicating a higher 
socio-economic status), having children under 16 years of age (No children under the age of 16 
in the household=0, any number of children under the age of 16 in the household=1) and age 
(18-87). Attitudinal covariates were also included, such as knowledge of the addictiveness of 
smoking; “Smoking is a real addiction” on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Completely 
disagree” to 5 “Completely agree”. Knowledge of the harms of (passive) smoking was computed 
as a mean score from a scale with 7 items (α=.90); “Smoking causes 1) heart disease, 2) lung 
cancer, 3) mouth- and throat cancer, 4) stroke” and “Passive smoking causes 5) asthma in children 
6) lung cancer 7) heart diseases” all on a five point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Completely 
disagree” to 5 “Completely agree”.
Statistical analyses
Linear regression models were built using SPSS statistics version 23. In the first model, which 
can be seen in Table 2, all variables were regressed on support for one of the three policies. In a 
second step, interaction effects (child protection × smoking status, child protection × opposition 
to state intervention, child-protection × opposition to a governmental role in tobacco control) 
were determined by comparing models with and without the interaction of interest using F 
change model fit statistics. In a third step, significant interactions (Figure 3a-3e) were added 
one by one and examined further.
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RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 gives an overview of descriptive statistics. Figure 1 shows policy support for the three 
prospective policies on a five-point Likert scale as a function of support for the protection of 
children. Figure 2 shows a chart of the support per policy measure of all investigated subgroups 
(the percentage of respondents per group that indicated ‘Agree’ and ‘Completely agree’ to the 
policy support questions). Groups in this figure were based on smoking status (0=non-smoker, 
1=smoker) and a median split of opposition to state intervention (0=low, 1=high) and opposition 
to a governmental role in tobacco control (0=low, 1=high).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (with regression weights, n=1,631)
Range % / Mean N SD
Children should be protected against tobacco with legislation 
(Completely disagree)
0-1 6% 98 -
Children should be protected against tobacco with legislation 
(Disagree)
0-1 13% 219 -
Children should be protected against tobacco with legislation 
(Not agree, not disagree)
0-1 25% 412 -
Children should be protected against tobacco with legislation 
(Agree)
0-1 26% 418 -
Children should be protected against tobacco with legislation 
(Completely Agree)
0-1 30% 483 -
Female 0-1 52% 832 -
Having any number of children under age 16 in household 0-1 25% 401 -
Smoker 0-1 26% 416 -
Socio-economic status 1-5 3.11 - 1.27
Addiction knowledge 0-5 4.31 - 0.94
Health effects knowledge 0-5 3.86 - 0.81
Age 18-87 44.11 - 18.44
Opposition to state intervention 1-10 6.70 - 2.56
Opposition to a governmental role in tobacco control 1-5 2.37 - 0.98
Support for banning tobacco displays 1-5 3.20 - 1.30
Support for raising the age of sale to 21 1-5 3.36 - 1.47
Support for limiting sales to specialized shops 1-5 3.11 - 1.54
3
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 54
54
Chapter 3
Figure 1: Policy support per policy measure on a 5 point Likert scale as a function of the item: ‘Suppose 
legislation is possible to ensure that (your) children never start smoking. To what extent would you agree?’
Figure 2: Percentage policy support per policy measure (the sum of ‘Agree’ and ‘Totally agree’), according 
to smoking status, state interventionism (median-split) and ideas about the proper role of government in 
tobacco control (median-split)
Main effects
The model with main effects per policy measure can be found in Table 2. Results are reported with 
the first dichotomized answer category of the independent variable as a reference. Support for the 
protection of children against tobacco with legislation is positively associated with policy support 
for all policies. Each answer category of support for the protection of children against tobacco was 
tested as a reference category and compared to the subsequent category. In general, support for 
policies increased as a function of support for the protection of children against tobacco.
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Interaction effects
Smoking status
Adding interactions terms of smoking status improved model fit for all three policies (banning 
tobacco displays: F change=11.90, p=.000, raising the age of sale to 21: F change=7.24, p=.000, 
limiting sales to specialized shops: F change=10.40, p=.000). These interactions can be seen 
in figure 3a, 3b and 3c. Interactions with smoking status and support for the protection of 
children against tobacco is similar for support for banning tobacco displays and support for 
limiting sales to specialized shops: there is no interaction of smoking status between answer 
categories 1 (Completely disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (Not agree, not disagree) and 4 (Agree). 
The only interaction observed is between points 4 (Agree) and 5 (Completely agree) for both 
policies. When four is the reference category and compared to the fifth category: banning 
tobacco displays: β=-0.17, p=.000, limiting sales to specialized shops: β=-0.14, p=.000 (Figure 
3a and 3c). Interaction of smoking status was observed concerning support for raising the age 
of sale to 21 (Figure 3b), but these interactions concerned the first three categories (between 
the first and second (β=-0.23, p=.000) and second and third answer category (β=-0.91, p=.000)).
Opposition to state intervention in general
Opposition to state intervention in general was interacting with support for the protection 
of children in relation to support for banning tobacco displays (F change=4.93, p=.001). This 
interaction is plotted and can be seen in Figure 3d. The overall interaction effect is weak and with 
regard to the first answer category, reversed: more policy support is observed for respondents 
that think that individuals should take more responsibility in providing for themselves, and less 
policy support is observed for respondents that think the state should take more responsibility 
to ensure that everyone is provided for. With the exception of this interaction, support for 
banning tobacco displays across subgroups increases as support for the protection of children 
increases .When it comes to raising the age of sale to 21 (F change=0.58, p=.680) and limiting 
sales to specialized shops (F change=0.79, p=.529), no interaction effects were observed (figures 
not shown).
Opposition to a governmental role in tobacco control
Opposition to a governmental role in tobacco control was interacting with support for the 
protection of children in relation to support for limiting sales to specialized shops (F change=4.95, 
p=.001). This interaction is plotted and can be seen in Figure 3e. The overall interaction effect 
is weak and in the expected direction (the more support for the protection of children against 
tobacco, the more policy support in all groups). When it comes to banning tobacco displays (F 
change=0.83, p=.507) and raising the age of sale to 21 (F change=0.64, p=.633), no interaction 
effects were observed (figures not shown).
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Figure 3a: The association between support for the protection of children 
against tobacco with legislation and support for banning tobacco displays: 
interaction with smoking status.
 
Figure 3b: The association between support for the protection of children 
against tobacco with legislation and support for raising the age of sale to 
21: interaction with smoking status.
 
Figure 3c: The association between support for the protection of children 
against tobacco with legislation and support for limiting sales to specialized 
shops: interaction with smoking status.
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Figure 3d: The association between support for the protection of children 
against tobacco with legislation and support for banning tobacco displays: in-
teraction with opposition to state intervention.
 
Figure 3e: The association between support for the protection of children against 
tobacco with legislation and support for limiting sales to specialized shops: in-
teraction with opposition to a governmental role in tobacco control.
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DISCUSSION
Support for the protection of children against tobacco with legislation was positively associated 
with support for three prospective tobacco control retail policies. These relationships were also 
observed for opponents of state intervention and opponents of a governmental role in tobacco 
control although the last group had less absolute policy support. There were interactions with 
smoking status indicating that the association between believing in the need to protect children 
against tobacco and support for tobacco retail policies was stronger among non-smokers than 
among smokers. This interaction effect was less pronounced for support for raising the age of 
sale to 21.
We did not find an association between respondents’ opposition to state intervention in 
general and their support for tobacco control policies. This may be because opposition to 
state intervention was measured in a more classical ‘right-to-left’ way with reference to the 
extent in which the government provides for its people. Such a concept may be more readily 
associated with support for policies to ensure that all citizens are satisfied in their basic needs, 
such as welfare state policies (e.g. social welfare or labor market policies) rather than tobacco 
control. We did, however, find a negative association between opposition to a governmental 
role in tobacco control and support for these tobacco control policies. Thus, in this case, more 
specific ideological beliefs were more clearly related to policy support. This falls in line with 
the observation that more general (symbolic) ideological beliefs about the size and scope of 
government are not always related to specific policy issues, whereas more specific (operational) 
beliefs may (25). Cohen (24) argues that opposition to tobacco control may have nothing to do 
with tobacco per se, but tobacco may act as a vehicle for more government intrusion into the 
life of citizens. Our findings do not seem to support this argument since opposition to state 
intervention was not related to support for future policies and more specific opposition towards 
a governmental role in tobacco control was. These concepts were not related, perhaps indicated 
by the low correlation between the two. This may suggest that tobacco control is seen as a 
separate policy domain in which governmental intervention is approved.
Among smokers, support for the protection of children against tobacco was less strongly 
associated with support for banning tobacco displays and support for limiting sales to specialized 
shops. This finding can be explained by the reasoning that these policies would directly affect the 
smokers’ personal situation. Other scholars found that people engaging in unhealthy behaviors 
are less likely to support policies which aim to restrict these behaviors (11). Congruent with this, 
smokers support raising the age of sale to 21 – a policy that would not directly affect the personal 
situation of adult smokers. Furthermore, it may be expected that if individuals (both smokers 
and non-smokers) agree that children should be protected against tobacco with legislation, they 
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will support raising the age of sale to 21, which is an intervention primarily aimed at children 
and young adults.
The interaction of state intervention and support for the protection of children in relation 
to support for banning tobacco displays seems at odds with our hypotheses: respondents 
who thought individuals are responsible for themselves had more policy support when they 
completely disagreed that children should be protected (Figure 3d). This interaction effect is 
possibly due to small sample sizes in individual cells: only 98 respondents in our sample (6%) 
completely disagreed with the statement that children should be protected against tobacco with 
legislation. In some of the subgroup categories with regard to opposition to state intervention, 
there were as little as 22 respondents (1,4%). Small sample sizes in these extremes may have 
caused slightly biased estimates.
One limitation of this study was the measurement of the independent variable which was 
operationalized as: “Suppose legislation is possible to ensure that (your) children never start 
smoking. To what extent would you agree?” This question already contains the word legislation 
and is therefore bound to be related to policy support. Future scholars may want to use a 
better measure. Furthermore, the reported results are passive-observant and cross-sectional. 
To generate evidence for a causal ‘child effect’ future scholars may want to use an experimental 
research design.
A focus on children may be especially appealing to opponents of state intervention and 
opponents to a governmental role in tobacco control because this approach is aimed at youth 
prevention, which does not interfere with (adult) civil liberties or free adult choice (9,24). Our 
results suggest that a focus on the protection of children against tobacco is able to build a broad 
public support for tobacco control policies, even among opponents of state intervention in 
general and opponents of a governmental role in tobacco control.
CONCLUSION
People’s belief in the need to protect children against tobacco with legislation is positively related 
to support for prospective tobacco control policies. This means that tobacco control advocates 
and governments may use a child-frame to increase policy support.
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ABSTRACT
Background: One of the factors influencing variation in tobacco control policies across European 
countries is the relative  policy dominance of pro and anti-tobacco control interest groups. 
Scholars investigating this power balance have predominantly conducted single country case 
studies. This study aims to explore and describe the relative dominance of pro and anti-tobacco 
control interest groups across six European countries by using a tobacco display ban as a case 
study. We examined whether there are patterns and similarities with regards to two components 
of policy monopolies: framing of tobacco and institutional arrangements.
Methods: 32 semi-structured interviews with 36 key stakeholders were conducted in Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands. These interviews were coded using the 
Framework Method.
Results: In countries where health Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have a relative 
policy dominance, tobacco consumption was predominantly framed as a health issue, NGO 
communities were well developed, the industry was largely absent in terms of production 
and manufacture, the health ministries played central roles in the policymaking process, and 
FCTC article 5.3 was strictly interpreted. In countries where the tobacco industry has a relative 
policy dominance, tobacco was framed as a private problem, NGO communities were absent 
or weak, the industry was well represented, the health ministries played subordinate roles in 
the policymaking process, and FCTC article 5.3. was only interpreted in terms of transparency.
Conclusion: The ways in which tobacco consumption is framed in a country and the ways in which 
institutions are arranged correspond to the policy monopoly in place, with strong similarities 
across countries with the same policy monopoly.
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BACKGROUND
Tobacco consumption causes 700,000 deaths per year in the European Union (1). A recent study 
in 126 countries investigated the effectiveness of five key tobacco control policy measures and 
concluded that countries fully implementing more measures experienced greater reductions 
in smoking prevalence (2). Tobacco control policy development in European countries is a 
functioning example of multilevel governance, as policy is developed at various levels (3). The 
international level of governance includes efforts by the World Health Organization through 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and by the European Union through 
Tobacco Product Directives (TPDs), decisions, regulations, and recommendations. Alongside 
these international efforts, much of the responsibility for comprehensive tobacco control policy 
rests with national governments (4).
There are many different ways for national governments to reduce tobacco consumption, 
including tobacco taxation, smoke free legislation, health warnings, bans on advertising, 
promotion, and sponsorship and cessation programs (5). A display ban of tobacco products at 
points of sale is part of Article 13 of FCTC and is seen as an emerging intervention (6). European 
countries demonstrate considerable variation with regard to the implementation of this measure, 
as some national governments have implemented it more than a decade ago, while others have 
only recently began to prepare legislation or have not yet begun to discuss it. It is therefore well 
suited to be a case for a cross-national comparison of tobacco control policymaking.
In explaining variations in tobacco control policy, several theories may be used: 1) policy 
learning and diffusion theory, 2) theories focusing on the importance of political cultures (e.g. 
corporatism), 3) theories looking at aspects of institutionalism (e.g. federalism) and 4) theories 
which focus on the role of interest groups (7). While all of these theories may offer unique 
insights into how tobacco control policies are adopted, a growing body of policy research 
focuses on interest groups and their relative influence on the policy process (8,9). Advocacy by 
interest groups is an important concept in explaining achievements in tobacco control (10,11). 
Stronger regulations are readily attributed to the existence and activities of a relatively strong 
national network of health NGOs (10,12,13) and weaker or averted regulations are attributed to 
a relatively more dominant tobacco industry and associated businesses (14–16). It is claimed that 
without efforts from health NGOs, tobacco control policymaking remains in the hands of policy 
elites who are susceptible to economic arguments from the tobacco industry (11).
Empirical evidence on the relative power balance of pro and anti-tobacco interest groups is 
often based on single country case studies (3). Such studies are able to offer thick and rich 
descriptions of what is relevant in those countries, providing ‘illuminating accounts of who did 
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what to whom and when’ (4). However, to better understand differences in tobacco control 
policy comprehensiveness across political systems, a cross-national approach is preferred (4). 
As (political) institutions differ between European countries, a comparison of various political 
systems can highlight the role of such institutions in the policy process (17). Single country case 
studies typically treat such variables as constants (18).
Policy dominance refers to a relative dominance in the process of policymaking of some interest 
groups rather than others. Although it is acknowledged that interest groups are clashing on an 
ongoing basis over time to advance their agendas (19), one interest group usually has more 
power than the other(s) within a given country. This relative dominance can be examined 
by drawing from the theory of policy monopolies. This interest group theory is well suited 
for a cross-national comparison, as it allows for the incorporation of framing and (political) 
institutions, which are both associated with the relative power of pro and anti-tobacco interest 
groups. A policy monopoly is defined as ‘a monopoly on political understandings concerning the 
policy of interest and an institutional arrangement that reinforces that understanding’ (20). A 
policy monopoly has two main components: 1) the dominant frame of a policy issue and 2) how 
institutions are arranged to reinforce a certain monopoly (21).
The first component refers to the political understanding of the issue (i.e. the dominant frame). 
It is argued that only one side of a complex policy issue tends to dominate the public and political 
discourse at a time, which has an effect on resultant policy outcomes (20). Often, only a single 
dimension of a multi-dimensional policy issue gains prominence in the political and public debate 
(11). In tobacco control, proponents and opponents of stricter legislation frame the issue of 
tobacco consumption in different ways, focusing on different dimensions of the policy issue 
(10). A relative policy dominance of the tobacco industry and associated businesses may be 
reflected by liberal-conservative policy frames which highlight positive dimensions of the policy 
issue, such as the economic benefits of tobacco consumption, employment associated with the 
tobacco sector, or free individual choice. A relative dominance by health NGOs, on the other 
hand, may be reflected by policy frames highlighting the negative aspects of the policy issue, 
focusing predominantly on the detrimental health effects of smoking.
The second component of policy monopolies refers to institutional arrangements, as policy 
monopolies are hypothesized to be institutionally reinforced (9,23). Institutions may be defined 
as ‘relatively enduring features of political and social life that structure behavior and that cannot 
be changed easily or instantaneously’ (23). Institutions are typically created and/or reorganized 
during short periods of increased attention to a policy issue and remain in place after the 
attention is directed to other issues, sustaining procedures and biases ‘designed to achieve 
one set of goals rather than another’ (21). Examples of institutional arrangements relevant 
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to the power interest groups have in tobacco control are how such groups are organized and 
a government’s interpretation of FCTC’s Article 5.3 which states that all signed parties ‘act 
to protect policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in 
accordance with national law’ (24).
By looking at the case of a tobacco display ban, we will investigate how the countries under study 
differ with regard to the relative policy dominance of pro and anti-tobacco interest groups. We 
will focus on the two main components of policy monopolies: the dominant frame of tobacco 
and institutional arrangements that reinforce a certain monopoly. We will describe and compare 
policy monopolies of pro or anti-tobacco control interest groups across six European countries.
METHODS
Project background
This study was part of a larger study conducted in seven EU countries: Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal. The SILNE-R project aims to assess 
how smoking prevention strategies are adopted and implemented within seven countries, at 
national, municipal, and school levels, and how the process of adoption and implementation 
varies between countries, cities, and schools.
Stakeholder selection
National representatives of the SILNE-R project provided a list of key stakeholders relevant to 
national tobacco control policymaking, in some cases with help of national key informants known 
to the project. Thirty-four semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders were conducted 
in English, German, and Dutch. Stakeholders were selected because of their involvement in 
the tobacco control policymaking process in each country. To get different perspectives on 
tobacco control policymaking, at least five different types of national level key stakeholders 
were selected: a civil servant, a member of parliament, an academic expert, an employee of a 
national cancer fund or other health NGO and, if applicable, an employee of a national tobacco 
control alliance (see Table 2 for the list with stakeholder professions).
A total of 55 stakeholders were contacted for an interview via e-mail, of which 11 did not respond 
and 10 declined. Non-response was mostly observed from members of parliament. Provided 
reasons not to participate were either having other obligations or a heavy workload. Thirty-
four interviews with 38 stakeholders (i.e. four interviews with two stakeholders per interview) 
were conducted between January 2017 and August 2017. Twenty-nine interviews were done 
face-to-face and 5 were done by phone. The interviews lasted 64 minutes on average and were 
transcribed verbatim. Each type of stakeholder was successfully interviewed in every country, 
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except for a Dutch civil servant (because of the salience of the policy issue at that time) and an 
Italian member of parliament (four members of parliament did not respond to the first invitation, 
nor the reminder).
Portugal was excluded from the study due to continued non-response of stakeholders. We 
were only able to conduct two phone interviews in Portugal and although these were rich in 
information, we decided more data was needed to make valid claims about the Portuguese 
policy process surrounding a tobacco display ban.
Confidentiality
To ensure confidentiality, we anonymized stakeholder professions as much as possible, on 
condition that these should not lead to the identification of individuals. Quotes were taken over 
literally from the transcripts, although we did not select quotes that could lead to identification 
of specific stakeholders.
Interview topics
The interviews started with an open question about the current status of a tobacco display 
ban in the country. Following this question, the first author used a topic list (see Appendix 
1) to bring up various themes: organization of pro and anti-tobacco control interest groups 
(types of organizations, resources, reasoning, framing, beliefs, priorities, strategies, influence); 
governmental framing of tobacco consumption; government ideology; country specific themes; 
access to policymaking (informal rules, FCTC 5.3); administrative capacity; public support; 
tobacco industry presence; policy learning; and interaction with other policies. The interviewer 
encouraged spontaneously emerging themes.
Analysis
The framework method was employed because this methodology allows researchers to analyze 
the data both by groups of cases (e.g.: individual countries) and by themes (25). A codebook was 
developed by coding the Finnish interviews and by subsequently coding the German interviews. 
The large contrast between these two countries in terms of tobacco control policymaking 
facilitated the development of a comprehensive codebook. Themes were developed both 
inductively and deductively, as the main codes (framing and institutions) were theoretically 
informed and sub-codes were predominantly informed by the interviews.
Informed by the two components of policy monopolies, three main themes were formulated: 1) 
the dominant frame of tobacco consumption, 2) civil and business institutions (i.e.: businesses 
such as retailers and the tobacco industry in terms of manufacture and production, since these 
institutions also affect the ability of the pro-tobacco interest groups to obtain a relative policy 
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dominance), and 3) government institutions. The codebook was further refined and improved 
by means of multiple discussions with the second and third author. TGK reread the transcripts 
various times to ensure no themes were missed after modifications to the codebook in later 
stages. MCW read several transcripts to check for coding rigor, allowing for further refinement of 
the coding criteria. TGK then systematically coded the complete set of transcripts using MAXQDA 
version 12 (26). TGK developed a framework matrix per code, in line with the Framework Method. 
These matrices contained all coded text segments and were grouped per country. A country 
summary was made per code. The matrices were checked by MCW as well. The final codebook 
can be seen in Table 1. A full list of stakeholders (anonymized) can be found in Table 2.
Table 1: Overview of codes
Main codes Code Sub code
Dominant frame Public health - Tobacco as an addictive substance
- Need to protect children’s health
- Economic burden to society
Liberal-conservative - Smoking as individual choice
- Tobacco is a legal product
- Nanny state/patronizing 
government
No frames/discussion
Civil and business institutions Health advocacy institutions -
Retailers -
Tobacco industry - Industry advocacy
- Industry image
- Economic presence  
(Manufacture and production)
Government institutions Public health policy frameworks -
Interpretation FCTC article 5.3 -
Health ministry centrality -
4
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Table 2: List of stakeholders per country
Country Stakeholder function(s)
Belgium 1. Civil servant
2. Member of parliament (opposition)
3. Cancer fund employee
4. Academic expert
5. Academic expert
6. Prevention organization employee
Finland 1. Civil servant
2. Member of parliament (opposition)
3. Cancer fund employee
4. Academic expert
5. Tobacco Control Alliance network employee
6. Enforcement agency employee
Germany 1. Civil servant
2. Member of parliament (coalition)
3. Assistant of member of parliament
4. Cancer fund employee
5. Academic expert
6. Civil society organization employee
7. Civil society organization employee
Ireland 1. Civil servant
2. Member of parliament (senate)
3. Cancer fund employee
4. Academic expert
5. Alliance network employee
Italy 1. Civil servant
2. Civil servant assistant
3. Cancer fund employee
4. Academic expert
5. Academic expert
6. Civil society organization employee
7. Civil society organization assistant
The Netherlands 1. Member of parliament (opposition)
2. Cancer fund employee
3. Academic expert
4. Tobacco Control Alliance network employee
5. Tobacco Control Alliance network employee
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RESULTS
Overall, three clusters of countries emerged from the data: a policy monopoly by health groups 
in Finland and Ireland; a policy monopoly by the tobacco industry and associated businesses in 
Germany and Italy; and Belgium and the Netherlands had more complicated policy contexts, as 
they demonstrated elements both indicative of health and industry monopolies. Table 3 provides 
a summary of all findings and smoking prevalence per country.
Dominant frame
The dominant government frame refers to how policymakers within individual countries frame 
the issue of tobacco consumption. Our data suggested that in countries with a health policy 
dominance (Finland and Ireland), tobacco consumption was predominantly framed as a public 
health issue, and in countries with a policy dominance by industry and business groups (Germany 
and Italy), tobacco consumption was mostly framed as a private problem to be dealt with in 
the private sphere (i.e.: as opposed to a public health problem). Since a policy discussion about 
tobacco consumption is mostly absent in these two countries (see section below), it can be 
argued that tobacco consumption is not necessarily considered a policy problem, but rather a 
private problem for citizens to solve themselves.
In Belgium and the Netherlands, stakeholders indicated that members of the ruling liberal-
conservative parties frame tobacco consumption as individual choice and do not want the 
government to be paternalistic. These frames are similar to the frames used in Germany and 
Italy, yet in the Netherlands and Belgium, stakeholders explicitly linked these frames to members 
of the ruling liberal-conservative parties. In Germany and Italy, the reluctance to interfere in 
‘private matters’ seemed more wide-spread, crossing both party lines and policy domains.
“There was an absolutely unanimous agreement that this is a harmful product. That we are 
dealing with an industry that has been not just deceitful but has told lies in the past about 
their knowledge about the damage their product did. And that our government has a duty 
to protect our children.”
Ireland, Member of Parliament
“It’s something that is only very reluctantly done in Germany - to have a policy that really 
influences personal freedom of decision making. So, Germany has been very reluctant to 
do something like that. Not only in health but also in other policies.”
Germany, civil society advocate
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“Germany in particular is very similar to Italy, I think. They are very interested in 
environmental problems, but the behaviors linked to health are something more personal.”
Italy, civil society advocate
“The VVD [liberal-conservative ruling party] is an anti-paternalistic party, and tobacco 
control policies are seen as paternalistic”
The Netherlands, civil society advocate
“The VLD is liberal-conservative and the mentality there is that everyone has to know for 
themselves what they do when it comes to protecting their health.”
Belgium, Member of Parliament
No frames
An emerging theme from our interviews was that there was no policy debate and therefore, no 
framing. In Italy and Germany, stakeholders said that nothing other than the strictly necessary 
debates (e.g. the transposition of the European TPD) were held for the last 10 years. If politicians 
mention tobacco consumption occasionally, they seem to regard it as a minor problem, or at 
least a private problem to be dealt with in the private sphere.
“Smoking is not very high on the agenda generally - it’s not really perceived as a big 
problem.”
Germany, civil society advocate
“The parliament addresses tobacco problems only if there is some law in discussion. For 
example, the transposition of the directive, or when the taxes change, or when the smoking 
ban was proposed, or ten years ago the adoption of the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control. But in other periods they don’t have an interest in tobacco control.”
Italy, civil servant
Civil and business institutions
Health advocacy institutions
In order to push for tobacco control regulations in general and a tobacco display ban in specific, 
there needs to be dedicated tobacco control advocates in a given country. How well the NGO 
community is developed logically affects the ability of tobacco control groups to have and 
maintain policy dominance and be able to advocate for a tobacco display ban. Our data suggested 
that such groups were well organized and plentiful in Finland and Ireland, with various degrees 
of cooperation. In contrast, in Germany, such groups were considered weak and in Italy, such 
groups did not fully crystallize yet.
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“In Finland there is a really large NGO community. Huge, powerful NGOs - but you also have 
to realize that most of the NGOs receive public money.”
Finland, civil society advocate
“We don’t have such a strong NGO structure as in many other countries. It’s mostly health 
organizations and research institutions that deal with diseases like cancer and others. 
Therefore, they see tobacco as a big problem and engage in tobacco control. There are 
only very few NGOs, very small… not very powerful... With a few exceptions that only focus 
on tobacco control.”
Germany, civil society advocate
“There is the need of creating a sort of infrastructure where non-governmental organizations, 
scientists, cancer patient associations, associations of people with heart attacks, go together 
in order to push for a new law. This does not exist in Italy at the national level, it is not 
developed.”
Italy, civil society advocate
In Belgium and the Netherlands, stakeholders indicated that there is a well-organized NGO 
community and that there is cooperation between individual NGOs. Belgian stakeholders 
often contrasted their situation with the Dutch situation and stated that coordination between 
individual NGOs exists to a lesser degree than in the Netherlands and this was believed to be 
one of the reasons there has not been much policy development with regard to tobacco control 
over the last years.
“We are heading towards a new modus operandi; we’re starting to delineate that now. But 
implicitly I’m saying that we are not strong enough right now.”
Belgium, civil society advocate
“The idea behind our alliance is that if you work together, you are much more powerful, and 
it is better to speak with one voice instead of many different voices who all want something 
else. Concerning lobby, this works quite well, and if we send a letter, we always do that in 
name of the three big funds.”
The Netherlands, civil society advocate
Retailers
In addition to the tobacco industry, associated businesses such as retailers are institutions that 
often oppose stricter future tobacco control legislation, and a tobacco display ban in specific.
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In all countries, stakeholders indicated that tobacco retailers expressed themselves against 
display bans. In Italy and Germany, stakeholders mentioned such opposition less, but as 
simultaneously observed, a political tobacco control debate in these countries was claimed to 
be largely absent. In all other countries, retailers have voiced strong opposition towards such 
a ban. One of the factors brought forward by stakeholders which may explain this opposition 
is sponsorship contracts with the industry, which were mentioned in interviews from Belgium, 
Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands. This is a type of income paid by the tobacco industry to 
retailers to display tobacco products. Small shopkeepers can be especially dependent on such 
income, as their total revenue is often lower compared to bigger shops or chains. As an example, 
in the Netherlands, retailers receive on average 10,250 euros per year to display tobacco packs 
at points of sale (27).
“You will not hear the tobacco industry in the media here in Belgium; it is especially the 
tradespeople who are very active. And why? Because they receive a lot of money from the 
tobacco industry because of the sponsorship contracts. He who pays the piper calls the 
tune.”
Belgium, civil servant
Tobacco industry
Similar to how the organization of health groups affect their ability to have and maintain a health 
policy dominance in individual countries, the tobacco industry and how well it is represented 
within a country in terms of production and manufacture logically affects its ability to have and 
maintain an policy dominance and thus exert influence against the adoption of a tobacco display 
ban and other regulations.
In countries with a presumed policy monopoly by the tobacco industry and associated business 
(Germany and Italy), stakeholders indicated that the manufacture and production of tobacco still 
plays an important role in the domestic economy. Germany is the largest exporter of cigarettes 
in the EU and second in the world (28). Italy is the largest tobacco grower of all EU countries, 
producing 25% of total raw European tobacco crops (29). Moreover, the economic presence 
of the tobacco industry in Italy is expanding rather than diminishing, as the new Phillip Morris 
headquarters for IQOS has opened in 2016 in a village near Bologna, promising up to 600 jobs 
and investing 500 million euros in the Italian economy (30). The previous Prime Minister Matteo 
Renzi and other governmental representatives attended the opening ceremony.
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“Politicians are very not very keen to face tobacco control. We had Renzi before, a prime 
minister that was promoting new things with tobacco. Italy is the nation where Philip Morris 
is testing IQOS. […] He [Renzi] was really proud of this and the tobacco industry did several 
investments for plants in several locations near Bologna. There was another 500 million 
euros promised by 2020 for the purchase of Italian tobacco.”
Italy, academic expert
In virtually all German federal states, there are tobacco industry representations in terms of 
production and manufacture (31). German stakeholders perceived these local representations 
to be a deliberate tactic by the tobacco industry, enabling a route of influence from the local 
constituencies to the federal level, advocating against further tobacco control regulations.
“In every state they want to have a little location, not very big, but then they have the right to go 
to the politicians and say, ‘You must do something for the jobs. Otherwise we will lose the jobs!’”
Germany, civil society advocate
“There are many actors who can approach individual members of parliament in the 
constituencies. The influence of the industry via the constituencies and individual members 
of parliament is stronger than via ministries of the federal government itself.”
Germany, civil servant
Stakeholders from the other countries (Belgium, Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands), indicated 
that the economic presence of the tobacco industry in terms of production and manufacture 
had diminished over time and is currently small or negligible.
In Ireland and Finland, stakeholders stated that the tobacco industry suffers from a bad public 
image. In both countries, it also seemed part of the NGOs’ strategy to demonize the tobacco 
industry by labelling them untrustworthy, deceitful, or evil.
“Tobacco is not so difficult, because we have already been successful in demonizing -and 
rightly so - I mean, demonizing the tobacco industry. So that is much more straightforward 
than alcohol lobbying, which is much more difficult.”
Finland, civil society advocate
“I think the NGOs have generated sufficient levels of distrust among the general public 
around the tobacco industry. There’s no great love for them, they don’t have presence so 
they don’t provide loads of jobs and factories that you can identify.”
Ireland, civil servant
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Government institutions
Public health policy frameworks
Public health policy frameworks are governmental commitments to specified public health goals 
incorporated in national legislation and were only observed in countries where health groups 
had a clear policy dominance. Such frameworks facilitate the adoption of stricter tobacco control 
legislation, including display bans, to reach such goals.
Stakeholders in Finland and Ireland described the presence of such national public health policy 
frameworks. Both of these frameworks concerned endgame strategies with a specified goal 
of a smoking prevalence of less than 5% in a certain year (2030 in Finland, 2025 in Ireland). 
Furthermore, stakeholders indicated that both countries have an inter-sectoral approach to 
policymaking, as exemplified by the ‘Health in all Policies’ initiative in Finland (32), and the 
‘Healthy Ireland Framework’ in Ireland (33).
“The Healthy Ireland Framework is an initiative that is a cross-sectoral initiative that was 
launched by the prime minister of the country. It has to do with actions across all these 
different sectors, but also working with community- and voluntary organizations.”
Ireland, academic expert
Interpretation of FCTC’s Article 5.3
An example of a formal institutional arrangement is FCTC Article 5.3, which aims to protect 
public health policymaking from tobacco industry involvement. All six countries in our study have 
signed and ratified the FCTC and thus signed to commit themselves to the implementation of 
article 5.3 as well. However, interpretation of this article varies widely across governments. Our 
data suggested that countries with a policy dominance by health groups (and the Netherlands) 
tended to interpret this article more strictly than countries with an industry policy dominance 
(and Belgium), which seemed to interpret it mostly in terms of transparency. Given the fact that 
the industry wishes to avoid legislation, including display bans, a weak interpretation of article 5.3 
logically results in more influence of the tobacco industry and thus less stringent or no tobacco 
control legislation as an expected result.
In Finland and Ireland, the industry is invited to public consultations or allowed to send in 
their submissions on policy proposals, but this is considered part of a standard policy process. 
Stakeholders stated that the industry could voice their opinions, but that there are no further 
negotiations. A few stakeholders however also stated, that the industry can sometimes come 
up with useful additions to policy proposals, for example in relation to certain implementation 
issues. In Ireland, stakeholders indicated that they were met in relation to specific issues, such 
as commerce and smuggling.
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“I think in principle if members of the [health] committee say: ‘I want to listen to the 
representative of Philip Morris’, then that person will be invited. In the FCTC, there is this 
famous article 5.3 which says that tobacco companies and tobacco industry must not be 
involved in tobacco policymaking, and that is very well followed in most of the Western 
countries, like in Finland. So, when the ministry and the government propose legislation, 
they don’t negotiate with the tobacco industry anymore. The tobacco industry can send a 
letter to them if they want, but there’s no negotiating anymore.”
Finland, Member of Parliament
“Not that they won’t listen. They listen, assess, and make a decision, in fairness. The WHO 
though, made it very clear that we shouldn’t be meeting with tobacco companies when we 
are talking about tobacco policy. It is alright to meet in regard to other matters in relation 
to commerce and smuggling and all that stuff. That’s fine.”
Ireland, Member of Parliament
In the Netherlands, although it is not clear whether health groups have a policy monopoly, 
article 5.3 is strictly interpreted. A stakeholder stated that the ministries of Health and Finance 
developed an internal document describing rules of conduct to deal with advocates from the 
tobacco industry, which was perceived to be the result of a court case from a NGO against the 
Dutch state. According to the stakeholders, this resulted in an interpretation which includes the 
industry only when it comes to technical implementation issues and that these contacts need to 
be transparent. This interpretation is quite similar to the interpretation in Finland and Ireland.
“At this moment, the guideline for civil servants is that one should limit oneself to technical 
implementation issues.”
Netherlands, academic expert
In the other countries (Belgium, Italy and Germany), stakeholders stated that FCTC’s article 5.3 
is predominantly interpreted in terms of transparency, and it was noted that there are no formal 
rules of conduct for civil servants. In Italy, a stakeholder indicated that ministries other than 
health seem to take many liberties with regard to their contacts with the tobacco industry, as 
long as they report all interactions afterwards. In Germany, a stakeholder stated that the Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture - responsible for tobacco product regulation - reports meetings with 
the industry on their website, with the subject of the meeting and with whom the meeting was 
held, but no further information is provided. When these documents are requested by means 
of a freedom of information act request, they are received with large parts blacked out.
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“There is a sort of light interpretation because they intend article 5.3 only on the side of 
transparency. If the relations are transparent, you can do everything.”
Italy, civil servant
“‘The Ministry of Food and Agriculture says: ‘We show what meetings we have on our 
internet site’. But all you see is for example the date and it says the ministry and there were 
for example [representatives from the] “Deutschen Zigarettenverband” [an organization 
representing five tobacco manufacturers] and they talked about taxes or something like that, 
and you don’t get any more information. They say this fulfils 5.3. This is transparent. ‘Look 
here: we have showed that we have met with them’. And the names of the people of the 
government are blacked out. If we do get information, then many things are blacked out.”
Germany, civil society advocate
Health ministry centrality
When the health ministry plays a central role in policymaking, resultant policy is likely stricter and 
more health oriented than when other ministries such as trade and finance take the policy lead. 
Our data suggested that countries where there is a policy dominance by health groups (Finland 
and Ireland), the health ministry played central roles in the policy process, and in countries 
where the industry has more influence, the health ministry plays a more subordinate role in the 
process of policymaking (Germany and Italy).
In Finland and Ireland, the ministries of health took the policy lead and introduced new tobacco 
control initiatives, even in the absence of active advocacy from the health NGOs. This was said 
to be the case with the development of the previous tobacco acts in both countries, in which 
tobacco display bans were included as relatively minor issues in a large comprehensive packages 
of policy measures.
“He [health ministry civil servant] often was looking for the NGOs support for what he was 
doing, then the other way around. I think on many of the issues around some of these things 
he was very far-reaching and looking hard. So, the NGOs were behind him, supportive… He 
was the author of a lot of the legislation at the time.”
Ireland, civil servant
“Well in Finland we had the working group for what should be done for tobacco policy. It 
was quite a large-scale working group, led by the Ministry of Health. […] They published 
their report in 2009 and there were many suggestions to improve the Tobacco Act […]. This 
[a display ban] was one of those suggestions which was ultimately implemented.”
Finland, civil servant
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In the Netherlands and Belgium, stakeholders said that technically the health ministry 
has responsibility for tobacco control policy, yet it was further remarked that there was an 
unwillingness of liberal-conservative ruling parties to regulate any health behaviors. In Belgium, 
stakeholders remarked that the liberal-conservative Minister of Health seems to explicitly 
exclude the Ministry of Health from the policy process, as she predominantly consults a small 
set of personal staff members and party-loyal political advisors.
“This minister relies very heavily on her small entourage and involves the ministry only little. 
She sometimes even makes decisions without the ministry knowing.”
Belgium, civil society advocate
In counties with an industry policy dominance (Italy and Germany), stakeholders stated that 
the health ministry plays a less central role in tobacco policymaking. In Germany, this is very 
apparent, because the legislative jurisdiction with regard to tobacco policy when it comes to 
product regulation was said to reside in the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. When 
it comes to prevention issues, the Federal Ministry of Health was said to have jurisdiction. 
However, when the Ministry of Health wants to make tobacco control policy, one stakeholder 
noted that they have to prompt other ministries to prepare it. In Italy, it seems that although 
officially the health ministry has formal jurisdiction with regard to tobacco control policy, in 
practice they are perceived to fulfil an underdog position. Other ministries, such as the Ministry 
of Agricultural, Food and Forestry policies, Economic Development, Economy and Finance all 
were, as an illustration, primarily involved with the transposition of the European TPD. The 
Ministry of Health was consulted last.
“For tobacco and alcohol policy, responsibility in terms of product regulation mainly resides 
in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Responsibility for prevention resides in the Ministry 
of Health. The health ministry cannot simply say, ‘We will propose a bill and let’s get it done’. 
It would be nice, but unfortunately this is not the case.”
Germany, civil servant
DISCUSSION
In countries with a similar policy dominance (i.e. more relative influence from either pro or anti-
tobacco interest groups), the same dominant frames were adopted, and civil and governmental 
institutions were arranged in comparable ways. In countries where there was a health policy 
monopoly, stakeholders indicated that tobacco consumption was framed as an incontestable 
public health problem, there were many well-developed health NGOs, the tobacco industry was 
largely gone and publicly discredited, the health ministry played a central role in tobacco control 
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policy development, and FCTC’s Article 5.3 was more strictly interpreted. In these countries, 
tobacco display bans were adopted more than a decade ago, as parts of a larger comprehensive 
policy packages. A largely reversed image was observed in countries where there was a tobacco 
industry policy monopoly. In these countries, stakeholders indicated that tobacco consumption 
was generally framed as a private problem of citizens, the health NGO communities were weak 
or absent in the tobacco control area, the tobacco industry still played a role in the domestic 
economy, while health ministries played subordinate roles in the formation of tobacco control 
policies, and FCTC’s article 5.3 was primarily interpreted in terms of transparency. In these 
countries, tobacco control issues, including a display ban, were not discussed in parliament 
for the last decade, apart from the necessary debates on transposition of European Tobacco 
Product Directives.
Our findings seem to illustrate an antagonism between pro and anti- tobacco control interest 
groups, where a relative policy dominance only seems to be maintained due to a lack of 
interference by opposing interest groups (19). This was the case in Ireland and Finland, where 
stakeholders stated there is a well-developed health NGO community and a largely absent (in 
terms of production and manufacture), and publicly discredited tobacco industry. In these two 
countries, the health NGOs were perceived to have a prominent role in shaping tobacco control 
policy.
In strong contrast to Finland and Ireland, stakeholders in Italy and Germany reported a 
considerable tobacco industry presence and a relatively weak or absent NGO community. This 
may leave the tobacco control policymaking process more susceptible to the tobacco industry, 
which may exert their influence through other more powerful ministries, particularly the 
ministries of Trade, Finance, and Agriculture.
Belgium and the Netherlands may be positioned in between these extremes, having mixed 
profiles containing elements both indicative of health and industry monopolies. Stakeholders 
from these countries stated that there is an NGO community in which independent NGOs 
join forces in advocating for tobacco control policy, but that members of the ruling liberal-
conservative political parties are reluctant to impose regulations in the health domain because 
they are perceived to be paternalistic. This was especially noticeable in Belgium, where the 
Minister of Health is from a liberal-conservative party and is unwilling to include the Ministry 
of Health into the drafting of a new tobacco plan.
When considering these three types of countries, it is illustrative to refer to Young (34) who 
makes a distinction between three types of government - non-profits relationships. These 
relationships can be either complementary (in which the non-profits and government work 
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together in partnership), supplementary (in which goods or services are provided in addition to 
those provided by the government), or adversarial (in which non-profits urge the government to 
make changes in public policy) (34). The complementary type of relationship is most applicable 
to Finland and Ireland, as there is close cooperation and partnership between NGOs and the 
government. The supplementary type is more applicable to Belgium and the Netherlands, where 
the NGOs may or may not be consulted, depending on the current ideology of the ruling parties. 
The situation in Italy and Germany seems most compatible with the last category, in which 
demands for change are voiced but do not seem to find much resonance within the government.
Some findings of this study closely resemble factors identified by Cairney et al. (35) on basis of 
interviews with more than 300 policy participants across 39 countries. These authors describe 
‘ideal type’ policy environments for tobacco control, where the department of health must take 
the policy lead; tobacco is framed as a public health problem; and the tobacco companies are 
excluded from the policy process, while consulting public health groups (35). They also describe 
the interrelatedness of some of these factors: having a health ministry that plays a central role 
in the process of policymaking automatically fosters the inclusion of public health groups and 
the exclusion of tobacco companies. Furthermore, having a central health ministry will likely 
keep the focus on health aspects of smoking (in contrast to other ministries such as trade and 
finance). Our findings confirm these factors, and our most progressive countries (i.e. Finland and 
Ireland) closely resemble their description of ‘ideal type’ policy environments.
This study is consistent with the assumption that national level tobacco control 
comprehensiveness is related to the relative power balance of national pro and anti-tobacco 
interest groups, as illustrated by the case of a tobacco display ban. The two countries that had 
a policy dominance by health groups, Finland and Ireland, were the only two countries in this 
study to adopt and implement a tobacco display ban in 2010 and 2002 respectively (36-37). 
These bans were considered relatively minor issues in a larger comprehensive package of policy 
measures. In countries in which the tobacco industry was suggested to have more relative policy 
dominance (Germany and Italy), there had been no tobacco control debate for the last decade 
or so, apart from the necessary debates on transposition of the TPD, suggesting policy inertia. 
In Belgium, a tobacco display ban was proposed within a larger policy package by two members 
of one of four ruling parties in Belgium in 2016 (38), but did not get a majority of votes in the 
House of Representatives, which is commonly observed in Belgium for proposals that seek 
alternative majorities (Keppens & Van Waeyenberg: Wisselmeerderheden in België doorgelicht, 
unpublished). In the Netherlands, the House of Representatives adopted a motion in 2015, 
calling on the government to reach a voluntary agreement with supermarkets to implement a 
display ban (39). After several attempts, the State Secretary for Health concluded that such a 
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voluntary agreement did not seem possible. In 2017, the parliament voted in favor of a legislative 
amendment to introduce a display ban (40).
A possible limitation of this study was that all findings rely on the perceptions of a limited number 
of key stakeholders per country. Although the stakeholders were carefully selected because 
of their central roles in the tobacco control policy process, their views may not be completely 
representative of tobacco control policymaking processes in their countries. However, the 
accounts from different stakeholders within a country demonstrated considerable similarities 
and compatibility, suggesting that they are indeed representative of the ‘actual’ policymaking 
processes in these countries.
Furthermore, we acknowledge that the policy processes underlying the variance in tobacco 
control policy comprehensiveness across different European countries are highly idiosyncratic 
and subject to numerous influences (e.g. historical, cultural) (4). However, despite these 
differences, we would like to emphasize that these countries also demonstrate considerable 
similarities with regard to framing and institutional arrangements, dependent on the policy 
monopoly in place.
Finally, the proposition that one of the two interest groups has a relative policy dominance may 
sound simplistic or even deterministic. Their relative power may better be conceived of as a 
continuum rather than in a strictly binary sense. The observation that one of the two interest 
groups has more power than the other within a country at a single point in time, does not 
automatically suggest that the other group is powerless. Pro- and anti-tobacco interest groups 
are known to clash on an ongoing basis over time to advance their respective agendas (19).
CONCLUSION
This study was the first empirical assessment of the power balance between pro and anti-
tobacco control interest groups across six European countries. Findings indicate that both 
framing and institutional arrangements coincide with the policy monopoly in place and that 
there are remarkable similarities across countries with the same suggested monopoly. If health 
advocates want to challenge an industry monopoly to push for more stringent legislation, 
including tobacco display bans, they may elect to adopt an approach that not only focuses on 
framing, but also targets the institutional arrangements which reinforce a policy monopoly by 
the tobacco industry.
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This thesis had a dual focus. In part I we examined determinants of tobacco control policymaking 
in European countries. In part II we focused on which characteristics contribute to European 
tobacco control partnership strength, which is an important determinant of tobacco control 
policymaking.
Overview
Cairney’s five core components related to tobacco control policymaking served as a guide to 
investigate aspects of the policy process throughout this thesis (1,2). Table 1 shows which of 
these components were studied in which chapter(s).
Table 1. Overview of core components of tobacco control policymaking as addressed in the chapters of this 
thesis
Core component Chapters
Societal factors 3,4
Institutions 4
Agenda setting/framing 2,3
Interest groups 4,6,7
The role and transfer of ideas 5
In Figure 1, the integrative framework of tobacco control policymaking by Willemsen (1) is shown. 
It posits how policymaking takes place. The five core components of policymaking in Table 1 
are represented within this framework. The framework shows how these components related 
to policymaking may interrelate. Studies in this thesis investigated aspects of this framework 
separately. Studies varied inasmuch as they incorporated more or less of such aspects in a single 
study. Chapter 4, for example, investigated multiple aspects simultaneously (effectiveness of 
pro- and anti-tobacco control interest groups, international requirements, dominant ideology, 
socio-economic conditions), whereas Chapter 5, for example, exclusively focused on one aspect 
of policymaking (transfer of ideas).
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Figure 1: An integrative model of tobacco control policymaking (Willemsen, 2018).
 
Main findings
Below we discuss per component which insights this thesis generated.
Societal factors
The societal factors relate to smoking prevalence, the importance of the tobacco industry 
for the national economy, and public attitudes towards tobacco control (2). In this thesis we 
found (Chapter 3) that public support for prospective tobacco control policies is higher among 
individuals who believe children should be protected against tobacco. We investigated this 
relationship in subgroups known to be skeptical towards more future tobacco control regulations: 
smokers, opponents of big government and opponents of a governmental role in tobacco control. 
Results showed that there was indeed a positive association between support for the protection 
of children against tobacco and support for three prospective policies. These results suggest 
that an issue frame highlighting the protection of children may help to increase public support, 
even among segments ideologically opposed towards tobacco control. It should be noted that 
smokers had less support for prospective measures than non-smokers, even if they believed 
children should be protected.
Chapter 4 highlighted the importance of tobacco industry presence (in terms of employment) as 
an obstacle to the development of comprehensive tobacco control. Previous work found that the 
economic presence of the tobacco industry indeed strengthens its negotiating position, due to 
claims of threatened employment when restrictive policies are implemented (3). Policymakers 
are usually susceptible to economic arguments (4). This thesis confirmed this mechanism. 
For example, in Chapter 4 we found that in Germany, having industry representations (both 
manufacture and production) in all federal states allowed industry representatives to exert 
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influence on state level politicians, who are also represented (i.e.: influential) in the federal 
government.
Institutions
Public policy scholars who study institutions generally connect policy outcomes with institutions 
that influence the progress of a policy (2). We defined institutions as “relatively enduring 
features of political and social life that structure behavior and that cannot be changed easily or 
instantaneously” (5). In Chapter 4, we found that there are several institutional arrangements 
associated with the relative influence that interest groups have in the tobacco control policy 
process. These include: the role that the health ministry plays in tobacco control policymaking, 
and the interpretation of Article 5.3. of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC). Cairney et al. (6) have emphasized the importance of a health ministry that needs to 
take the policy lead, which automatically fosters the inclusion of public health groups at the 
expense of pro-tobacco interests. However, our study was among the first to include various 
different institutional arrangements across several countries simultaneously. We found that 
policy monopolies correspond to the ways in which institutions are arranged. We observed 
similarities with regard to such institutions across countries with the same policy monopoly. In 
countries with an industry monopoly, for example, the health ministries play subordinate roles 
in the process of policymaking and FCTC Article 5.3. is interpreted in a limited way, restricted 
to promises of transparency.
Different policy outcomes were observed when health groups had a policy monopoly, compared 
to when the tobacco industry had a policy monopoly. In countries where there was a health 
policy monopoly, tobacco display bans were implemented already more than a decade ago as 
part of a large comprehensive tobacco control policy package. In countries that had a tobacco 
industry policy monopoly, there was policy inertia for a decade or more.
Agenda-setting / Issue framing
In Chapter 2, we referred to a body of literature that provides mostly ‘anecdotal’ (as opposed 
to scientific) evidence about the first phases of policymaking, which includes agenda setting. 
However, not much empirical research has been conducted on these phases as far as youth 
tobacco product access and exposure policies are concerned. We studied issue framing in 
Chapter 3, which is a key factor in the first phases of policy making. Findings suggest the possible 
benefits of using a child-frame, which is increasingly being used by tobacco control advocates 
in many countries (2,7,8).
In Chapter 4, we looked at the dominant governmental frame of tobacco consumption across six 
countries, and whether it corresponded to the policy monopoly in place. This turned out to be 
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the case: in countries where the tobacco industry had a policy monopoly, tobacco consumption 
was clearly understood as a private problem, as opposed to a public health problem. In countries 
where there was a clear health policy monopoly, tobacco consumption was clearly understood 
as a health issue.
Interest groups
Chapter 4, 6 and 7 concerned the role that interest groups play in the tobacco control policy 
process across European countries. Chapter 4 focused on pro and anti-tobacco control interest 
groups and on features of the policy environment that could facilitate or hinder their respective 
influence on the policy process. Because findings of Chapter 4 indicated that there is variance 
across countries with regard to how well the NGO tobacco control community is developed, we 
focused more on this aspect of tobacco control policy making in part II of the thesis.
Chapter 6 examined which characteristics contribute to tobacco control partnership strength. 
We organized an expert panel with tobacco control advocacy experts from 10 different European 
countries. We found ten characteristics related to tobacco control partnership strength in terms 
of influencing policy: (1) financial independence from government, (2) expertise in research and 
advocacy, (3) an evidence based approach, (4) access to nationally relevant data, (5) connections 
to policymakers, journalists, researchers, and other partnerships, (6) partner heterogeneity 
(7) conflict resolution, (8) a central coordinating office, (9) clear rules or statutes, and (10) a 
shared vision/consensus. These characteristics were classified into one of four categories of 
a health promotion partnership framework proposed by Lasker et al. (9): resources, member 
characteristics, relationships between members, and partnership characteristics.
In Chapter 7, we made a tentative comparison of the prevalence of such partnership 
characteristics across 17 European countries. We did this by means of a 22-item tool across 
3 dimensions (see Appendix 2). Some partnerships could improve with regard to a number 
of characteristics related to their potential strength. These characteristics included: having 
professional lobby expertise; access to national information on tobacco industry and lobbying; 
influence on national research agendas; agreement on roles and responsibilities; and agreement 
on how credits are divided among member organizations (e.g. visibility and recognition in society). 
Our comparison indicated that some European partnerships indeed have more characteristics 
related to partnership strength than others. Furthermore, one third of investigated countries did 
not include a national level tobacco control partnership according to our definition and criteria.
The role of ideas
Chapter 5 investigated considerations which play a role in lesson-drawing from other countries. 
We found that the German government is not inclined to look at other countries for lessons. 
8
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When governments are inclined to look at foreign examples, it seems more important that those 
‘exporter’ countries are similar and close to the ‘importer’ country, than that they are progressive 
in terms of tobacco control policy. This provides tobacco control advocates with opportunities to 
facilitate successful lesson-drawing in their countries. They may, for example, choose countries 
close by to draw lessons from, preferably if there are scientific studies available. When they 
choose global leading countries in terms of tobacco control, they may emphasize similarities to 
these countries in terms of policy or country contexts.
Theoretical considerations
As Clavier et al. (10) and Breton et al. (11) pointed out, the process of policymaking in health 
promotion, including the field of tobacco control, has received scant scientific attention. 
Therefore, the studies presented in this thesis focusing on determinants of tobacco control 
policymaking (part I) have been relatively novel contributions to this field of study. In the 
following section, we will describe what we have learned from these studies.
In Chapter 4, we applied the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, or more specifically, its (sub) theory 
of policy monopolies, to compare countries with regard to the relative influence that pro and 
anti-tobacco control interest groups have on the policy process. The theory of punctuated 
equilibrium posits that a policy remains stable most of the time, and that policy change occurs 
in response to punctuations of an equilibrium (12). This may happen when competing groups are 
successful in framing the dominant policy image and propose viable solutions fitting that frame. 
The competing group then determines how the issue is seen, understood and subsequently 
solved, at the expense of the other group. The authors of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory have 
addressed the possibility that policy monopolies may be the main cause of a policy equilibrium 
(i.e.: policy stability) (13). Such considerations highlight the importance of policy monopolies in 
explaining policy change and stability. We have found this theory useful in comparing multiple 
countries simultaneously with regard to the relative power of interest groups. Especially because 
it takes into account explanatory variables which vary across countries: how tobacco is framed 
and how institutions are arranged.
In times of policy stability, policy monopolies by either pro or anti-tobacco control interest 
groups are hypothesized to ‘dampen pressures for change’ from competing interest groups 
(14). The findings from Chapter 4 confirmed this mechanism: in countries where the tobacco 
industry had more influence on the policy process (Germany and Italy), there was policy inertia 
for at least a decade, and calls for change from tobacco control advocates did not resonate with 
policymakers. In these countries, the tobacco industry was able to keep the issue off the political 
agenda, or health groups were unable to put the issue on the political agenda. In countries where 
health groups had a policy monopoly (Finland and Ireland), the tobacco industry was excluded 
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from the policy process as a legitimate stakeholder, by a strict governmental interpretation of 
FCTC Article 5.3, and by an NGO community that fostered a bad public industry image. In these 
countries, large comprehensive policy packages in the domain of tobacco control were being 
enacted since a decade or longer.
Other theoretical frameworks may be better suited when studying the process of policymaking 
in a single country, particularly the Advocacy Coalition Framework, whose authors recommend 
its use on a single country case for periods of at least a decade (15), and Kingdon’s Multiple 
Streams Approach, which is a dynamic theory of policy change that can also be used on a single 
case over time (16). In practice, these theories are indeed often applied to single country case 
studies. Such approaches offer valuable theoretical insights into policymaking, yet the relevance 
of these insights is largely bound to specific countries (17). In contrast, a systematic cross-national 
comparison (Chapter 4) has the potential to discover variables that are treated like constants 
in single country case studies (18), such as the role of the health ministry in policymaking, the 
economic presence of the tobacco industry, and the interpretation of FCTC Article 5.3.
The scientific field of Health Promotion
Health promotion scholars typically focus on changing individual health behaviors and cognitions, 
while having less consideration for political determinants of health, such as policy measures. 
These scholars employ theoretical models such as the PRECEDE-PROCEED model (19), the 
I-change model (20), the Health Belief Model (21) and/or the Theory of Planned Behavior (22). 
When such models integrate policy measures, they are included as wider environmental factors, 
or contextual determinants of individual health behavior (19,20). Although the importance of 
policy measures as determinants of health behavior is acknowledged in health promotion, 
scholars do not often study them in isolation (23).
When health scholars do occasionally pay attention to policy measures, they have the tendency 
to investigate impacts of such measures. In other words: they focus on what happens after 
the implementation of policy measures, instead of what determines the adoption of such 
measures. The International Tobacco Control (ITC) project is an example of how policy impacts 
are evaluated, in terms of behavioral and psychosocial outcomes in smoker populations (24). 
Although it is important - also for policymakers - to know whether policy measures ‘work’ by 
demonstrating their (un)intended effects in populations, findings in this thesis emphasize that 
policy change is dependent on many other factors than knowledge of policy impacts alone (25).
For the sake of public health, it is certainly important to investigate individual health 
behaviors, but policy measures have the potential to improve the health of millions of citizens 
simultaneously. Health promotion would benefit from more attention to the initial phases of 
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the process of policymaking, in addition to a focus on changing behaviors and cognitions of 
individuals, and impacts of policy measures. This may mean that more collaboration between 
those working within the field of health promotion and public policy scholars is called for.
Methodological considerations
Strengths
The strength of this thesis lies in its focus on determinants of tobacco control policy (part I) and 
on tobacco control partnerships as unit of analysis (part II), its realist-inspired methodology, and 
its cross-country comparative approach. These strengths are discussed below.
Focus on determinants of tobacco control policymaking
This thesis focused on the adoption of tobacco control policies, instead of the impact of tobacco 
control policies on individual behavior, cognitions, or health. Providing more insight in how 
policy develops, can explain why countries differ with regards to their tobacco control policy 
comprehensiveness, and can enable tobacco control advocates to better exploit opportunities 
for policy change (26). Furthermore, interest groups are usually studied by means of theoretical 
frameworks that consider the policy process more broadly. We adopted an innovative approach 
by looking at tobacco control partnerships as unit of analysis, to assess what contributes to 
partnership strength, independent of the wider policy context. This approach gives practical 
starting points for advocates to monitor and improve their partnerships and to compare their 
partnerships to others in Europe.
Realist inspired
The realist inspired approach of Chapter 4 of this thesis goes beyond a focus on correlations 
between independent and dependent variables. It aims to explain how policy processes happen, 
with a special focus on context (27). In different words: it aims to assess how determinants of 
policymaking relate to policy outcomes, taking into account different policy and country contexts 
(Chapter 4).
Our approach in Chapter 4 and 6 was to first identify some of the (implicit) characteristics that 
are relevant to the process of policymaking or advocacy. Then, the relationship between these 
characteristics and policy outcomes was determined by making hypothesized mechanism(s) 
explicit. For example: national data on parliamentarian or political party attitudes towards 
tobacco control are an important resource for tobacco control partnerships, as it provides 
information on where to lobby most effectively (Chapter 6).
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Comparative
As argued before, a comparative study across multiple countries has the potential to discover 
more general patterns of policymaking transcending single country idiosyncrasies (17). We tried 
to determine such patterns. The study in Chapter 4 highlighted that some characteristics related 
to policymaking only become apparent in a cross-national study-setting, such as the centrality 
of the health ministry. In a single country case study, such variables are necessarily treated as 
constants (29). Another example of a transcending pattern of policymaking, are the roles that 
proximity and similarity play in lesson-drawing from other countries in tobacco control (Chapter 
5). By comparing multiple countries simultaneously, we discovered that overall, governments 
are inclined to learn policy lessons from nearby and similar countries.
Limitations
The main limitations of this thesis were that: we had to rely on a limited number of interviewees, 
we employed a single data source as opposed to multiple data sources, and we could not test 
for the relative importance of determinants. These limitations are further discussed below.
Limited number of interviewees
In Chapter 4 and 5, we drew country-level conclusions for six countries based on 32 interviews 
(Chapter 4) and for five countries based on 27 interviews (Chapter 5). It could be argued that 
these samples are small in total size. However, the needed sample size in qualitative studies is 
determined on different grounds from sample sizes in quantitative studies, where a larger sample 
is always preferred to detect (sometimes small) population effects.
According to Malterud et al. (30), the required size of a sample in qualitative research to have 
sufficient ‘information power’ depends on: the aim, the sample specificity, the use of established 
theory, quality of dialogue, and the analysis strategy (Figure 2). The higher the information 
power, the smaller the sample needs to be. Our study had a narrow focus (determinants of policy 
adoption, the case of a display ban), assured a dense sample specificity (by purposively selecting 
policy participants), applied two theories of policymaking (The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
and The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (14,31)), assured a high dialogue quality (by attending 
a course in interviewing-skills and using a theoretically informed topic list), and was cross-case 
(comparing multiple countries). With the exception of the last dimension, all other dimensions 
contribute to a high level of information power. More importantly, the interviews demonstrated 
considerable similarities and compatibility within countries, suggesting data saturation.
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Figure 2: Information power and its dimensions
One data source as opposed to multiple data sources
We could have used other data sources to supplement our interview and expert panel data 
(Chapter 4-6), such as policy documents (e.g.: submissions to public hearings, white papers), 
media coverage, or internal industry documents (32). Using more than a single data source in 
a study is called ‘data triangulation’ and is more commonly observed in qualitative, naturalistic 
studies such as undertaken in this thesis (33). An important downside of data triangulation 
is that it is much more time-consuming in comparison to single data analysis strategies (33). 
Unfortunately, we did not have the time and resources to supplement our data with other data 
sources. As we investigated policy processes, we expected most accurate information from 
stakeholders that were involved in the process of policymaking in their countries. However, these 
interviews could have been supplemented with more objective sources to verify the validity of 
stakeholder perceptions.
The relative importance of determinants
The studies in Chapter 4-6 did not test whether some determinants, considerations or 
characteristics were more important for tobacco control policymaking or advocacy than others. 
In Chapter 4, we do not make claims about which institutional arrangements or which types of 
framing are more important than others in explaining policy monopolies by pro or anti-tobacco 
control interest groups. In Chapter 5, we do not know which considerations in lesson-drawing 
take precedence over others. In Chapter 6, we present a list of 10 key characteristics related to 
tobacco control partnership strength, but we do not know which of these characteristics are 
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most important in explaining strength. We could not avoid or correct this limitation. Future 
researchers in this area may therefore use an appropriate study design to test the relative 
importance of determinants, considerations, or characteristics investigated in this thesis.
Generalizability
Generalizability to other countries
In line with findings of Chapter 5, we think that findings of this thesis may be generalizable 
to countries within Europe (nearby countries), as the data are predominantly collected within 
European countries. Furthermore, and also in line with Chapter 5, we argue that findings may 
also be generalizable to countries outside Europe, when there are enough similarities between 
those countries and the sample countries. We propose a number of attributes which may be 
relevant in determining generalizability to countries outside the EU: the degree of democracy, 
various institutional dimensions, and the stage in the tobacco epidemic model.
A potential aspect that is likely relevant to generalizability may be the degree of democracy of 
a given country. All countries included in this thesis guarantee civil rights such as the freedom 
of assembly and association (34). Furthermore, they secure basic democratic principles such 
as the organization of free and fair elections, and political participation (34). These rights and 
principles are not necessarily secured in all countries across the globe. Findings of this thesis 
may therefore be less generalizable to more autocratic and authoritarian regimes such as China, 
Russia or Turkey (35).
Institutional aspects that may be relevant to generalizability are federalism versus unitarianism 
and having a presidential versus a parliamentarian system (36). Most of the countries in our 
study had a unitary system of governance combined with a parliamentarian multi-party political 
system. Findings may be less generalizable to federal or presidential countries (or countries with 
both characteristics such as the United States). A parliamentarian system may for example offer 
more routes of influence for advocacy, as the governing coalition (and parliament as a whole) 
typically consists of multiple parties (13). In federal systems, national level advocacy may be 
less relevant, as policy change at lower levels can be more important to the formulation of 
comprehensive tobacco control (37). Findings of this thesis based on smaller European countries 
may therefore be better generalizable to lower levels of US government, such as US states, than 
to the federal level.
Further, the stage in which a country is, in terms of the tobacco epidemic model can be relevant 
in determining generalizability (39). Europe is in the fourth stage of the tobacco epidemic, yet 
many countries in Africa are in the first, and many countries in Asia are in the second stage 
of the model. Such countries currently experience a very high smoking prevalence, especially 
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among men (40). In countries at a later stage in the tobacco epidemic model, smoking prevalence 
is lower, which corresponds to a societal non-smoking norm (41). In such countries, there is 
generally more public support for comprehensive tobacco control than in countries with higher 
prevalence, earlier in the tobacco epidemic model. This relationship may largely be explained 
by the fact that smokers are more opposed towards tobacco control than non-smokers (42–44).
Generalizability to other policy measures
Chapter 4 specifically concentrated on the policy process of a tobacco display ban. A display 
ban was one of three access and exposure policy measures investigated in Chapter 2 and 3 
(in addition to an increase in age of sale and limiting the number of sale outlets). Chapter 5 
focused on various policy measures, even though data were collected with the primary goal of 
investigating the policy processes related to a display ban. Chapter 6 and 7 focused on advocating 
for the adoption of MPOWER policy measures in general.
The question arises whether the insights in this thesis, and most notably those of Chapter 4, 
can be generalized to other tobacco control policy measures, or tobacco control in general. A 
display ban is a supply-side policy measure which is predominantly adopted to protect children 
and smokers who are in the process of quitting smoking from exposure to tobacco products at 
points of sale (45). It can be argued that different considerations play a role when other policy 
measures are considered.
As was explained in the introductory chapter, there are many other policy measures available to 
governments to bring down smoking prevalence, such as increasing the excise tax for tobacco 
products, smoke-free environments, an increase in age of sale, limiting the number of sale 
outlets, plain packaging, health warnings, mass media campaigns, et cetera (46). It is likely that 
there are variations in the policy processes related to different policy measures. For example, 
when excise tax is considered, the Ministry of Finance may play a more prominent role in the 
policy process than the Ministry of Health (health ministry centrality; Chapter 4). When smoke-
free venues are considered, there are other pro-tobacco actors in the policy debate, such as the 
hospitality industry (instead of retailers; Chapter 4). It can also be argued that the effectiveness of 
frames depends on the policy measure. A liberal-conservative frame which posits that smoking 
is a private problem (as opposed to a public health problem; Chapter 4) is likely more effective 
with regard to supply-side restrictions than to smoke-free environments, as a problem can hardly 
be called ‘private’, when second-hand smoke harms the health of non-smokers.
Despite these possible variations, there may also be notable parallels between policy processes 
with regard to different policy measures. Tobacco control advocates may always want more 
and stricter legislation, the tobacco industry may always want less and more lenient legislation. 
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Furthermore, some more structural socio-economic features do likely not vary as a function of 
the policy measure, such as how well the industry is represented in terms of employment, or a 
government’s interpretation of FCTC article 5.3.
Generalizability to other policy domains
Findings of this thesis may be generalized to other policy domains, such as alcohol policy. Even 
though some scholars have argued that there is “tobacco exceptionalism” (47), which posits 
that tobacco is distinct in its harmfulness and that the tobacco industry requires a specific kind 
of treatment, there are considerable similarities between the policy domains of tobacco and 
alcohol. Both industries are dominated by large multinational corporations, which sometimes 
have more resources than national governments (48). Their economic interests are directly 
threatened by the implementation of comprehensive public health policies to regulate these 
products, which is why they both strongly oppose implementation of such policies (47). 
Furthermore, both industries are found to employ similar strategies in influencing policy (49) 
and there are interlinkages between the two industries at top management level (50). Countries 
also vary considerably in their implementation of comprehensive alcohol control policies to 
address the public health problems caused by alcohol consumption (51). Lastly, there are also 
notable parallels in the policy instruments that can be implemented to address tobacco and 
alcohol consumption. Governments may choose to regulate the supply-side through restrictions 
on product marketing or availability, or the demand-side through tax and price policies (52).
Implications for science
There is scant empirical evidence about determinants of tobacco control policymaking. In 
Chapter 2, we observed that tobacco control scholars typically study impacts of policy, rather 
than determinants of policy adoption, at least in the case of raising the age of sale, banning 
tobacco displays at points of sale, and limiting the number and type of tobacco outlets. More 
insight in the process of policymaking is needed, because the reason why some countries have 
weaker tobacco control policies than others is predominantly political (53). Furthermore, more 
insights into determinants of policymaking can provide tobacco control advocates in civil society 
with relevant knowledge about the policy environment in which they operate (54,55).
Future research could further extend the explorative work on tobacco control policy advocacy 
we conducted in chapter 6 and 7. Tobacco control advocacy is rarely the focus of study in tobacco 
control. Scholars could use complementary study designs to verify, supplement or modify the 
explored characteristics related to partnership strength. We studied perceptions of tobacco 
control advocacy experts to identify these characteristics. This is however, a rather subjective 
method. Future scholars may come up with other study designs to objectively measure advocacy 
8
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strength. This is a substantial challenge, however, because the link between advocacy activities 
and resultant policy outcomes is quite hard to establish (56).
Future scholars could alternatively also focus on political ideology in tobacco control (57). A 
liberal-conservative attitude of citizens or policymakers was in this thesis mostly understood as 
an obstacle to the formulation of comprehensive tobacco control policies. However, a liberal-
conservative attitude could also be compatible with tobacco control. Tobacco control is often 
seen as a threat to freedom (freedom from interference), however, as tobacco consumption 
is increasingly understood as an addiction, tobacco control could also be seen as an enabler 
of freedom (freedom from addiction) (58). Future scholars could thus try to identify ways in 
which tobacco control can be made an acceptable idea for all ideological segments in society 
and government.
Overall, future scholars could focus more on effective policy frames. In the Netherlands, the 
frame of the protection of children against tobacco seems effective in mobilizing policymakers to 
implement tobacco control policies (59). In other European countries such as the United Kingdom 
and France, health inequalities are found to be an appealing problem frame to policymakers 
(60). Future scholars could establish per European country, which frame seems most appealing 
to citizens and policymakers. It should be simultaneously investigated, however, to what extent 
various frames are actually effective in terms of producing comprehensive policy outcomes. 
Addressing health inequalities, for example, requires a difficult coordination across several policy 
sectors, and could therefore make the problem seem too difficult for policy intervention (60).
Implications for advocacy practice
Most studies in this thesis provide implications for tobacco control advocacy practice. We 
recommend advocates to enforce a better interpretation of FCTC Article 5.3, to make the 
health ministry responsible for tobacco control, to establish or further develop the national 
tobacco control NGO community, to denormalize the tobacco industry, and to draw lessons 
from successful nearby and/or similar countries in tobacco control.
A stricter interpretation of FCTC Article 5.3. could potentially be achieved through court cases. 
This strategy was observed to be successful in The Netherlands. The court case of an NGO 
against the Dutch state resulted in the development of an internal document describing rules 
of conduct to deal with advocates from the tobacco industry. Another way of enforcing a strict 
implementation of Article 5.3., is to develop formal codes-of-practice for policymakers. Such 
codification prevents the risk that general commitments to adhere to the guideline cease to 
exist when there is a change of government (61).
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In most European countries, the responsibility for tobacco control resides within the health 
ministry. In Germany this was however not the case. German advocates could direct attention 
to this case, also pointing to many other European countries where the jurisdiction for health 
policy resides in the health ministry.
The NGO community in some countries was better developed than in other countries. Chapter 6 
and 7 provide practical starting points for tobacco control partnerships, alliances or coalitions, to 
self-assess their partnerships and see whether they can increase the number of characteristics 
related to partnership strength. For example: acquiring lobby expertise, and finding ways 
to influence the research agenda of national statistical offices, public health institutes, or 
universities.
When enforcement of a strict interpretation of Article 5.3 is unsuccessful, tobacco control 
advocates may try to exclude the tobacco industry from the policy process by giving them a 
bad public image. They may do this by labelling them untrustworthy, deceitful, or evil. This was 
a strategy observed in Finland and Ireland.
Lastly, lessons in tobacco control can be drawn by tobacco control advocates and used in their 
communications to policymakers. They could choose best practice examples from nearby or 
similar European countries, or emphasize similarity in (policy) contexts to global leaders in 
tobacco control.
8
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 156
156
Chapter 8
REFERENCES
1. Willemsen MC. Tobacco control policy in the Netherlands: between economy, public health, and 
ideology. Cham: Springer; 2018. Available from: doi:10.1007/978-3-319-72368-6.
2. Cairney P, Studlar D, Mamudu HM. Global tobacco control: Power, Policy, governance, and transfer. 
London: Palgrave McMillan; 2011. Available from: doi:10.1057/9780230361249.
3. U.S. National Cancer Institute and World Health Organization. The Economics of Tobacco and Tobacco 
Control. National Cancer Institute Tobacco Control Monograph 21. NIH Publication No. 16-CA-8029A. 
Bethesda, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National 
Cancer Institute; Geneva, CH: World Health Organization; 2016.
4. Chaloupka FJ, Warner KE. The economics of smoking. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research; 1999. Available from: https://www.nber.org/papers/w7047.pdf [Accessed 20th November 
2019].
5. Mahoney J, Thelen K. A theory of gradual institutional change. In: Mahoney J, Thelen K. (eds.) Explaining 
institutional change: ambiguity, agency, and power. Boulder: Westview Press; 2010. p. 1–4.
6. Cairney P, Mamudu H. The global tobacco control “endgame”: Change the policy environment to 
implement the FCTC. Journal of Public Health Policy. 2014;35(4):506–17. Available from: doi:10.1057/
jphp.2014.18.
7. van Dooremaal M, Haandrikman R, Bos MB. Smokefree sports grounds contribute to a smokefree 
generation in the Netherlands. Tobacco Induced Diseases. 2018;16(1). Available from: doi:10.18332/
tid/84197.
8. Mackenbach J. The Netherlands smokefree: Doctors make a statement. Politicians should act now. 
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde. 2016;160:D310.
9. Lasker RD, Weiss ES, Miller R. Partnership synergy: A practical framework for studying and 
strengthening the collaborative advantage. Milbank Quarterly. 2001;79(2):179–205. Available from: 
doi:10.1111/1468-0009.00203.
10. de Leeuw E, Clavier C, Breton E. Health policy – why research it and how: health political science. 
Health Research Policy and Systems. 2014;12(1):55. Available from: doi:10.1186/1478-4505-12-55.
11. Breton E, de Leeuw E. Theories of the policy process in health promotion research: a review. Health 
Promotion International. 2011;26(1):82-90. Available from: doi:10.1093/heapro/daq051.
12. Baumgartner FR, Jones BD. Policy dynamics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2002.
13. Cairney P. Understanding public policy: Theories and issues. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2012.
14. True JL, Jones BD, Baumgartner FR. Punctuated-equilibrium theory: Explaining stability and change 
in American policymaking. In: Sabatier PA. (eds.) Theories of the policy process. Boulder: Westview 
Press; 1999. p. 97–115.
15. Breton E, Richard L, Gagnon F, Jacques M, Bergeron P. Health promotion research and practice 
require sound policy analysis models: the case of Quebec’s Tobacco Act. Social Science & Medicine. 
2008;67(11):1679–1689. Available from: doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2008.07.028.
16. Kingdon JW. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown and Co; 1984.
17. Marmor TR, Lieberman ES. Tobacco Control in Comparative Perspective: Eight Nations in Search of an 
Explanation. In: Feldman EA, Bayer R. (eds.) Unfiltered: Conflicts over Tobacco Policy and Public Health. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; 2004 p. 275-291.
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 157
157
General discussion
18. Baumgartner, F. R., Green-Pedersen, C. and Jones, B. D. Comparative studies of policy agendas. Journal 
of European Public Policy. 2006;13(7):959-974. Avalailable from: doi:10.1080/13501760600923805.
19. Gielen AC, McDonald EM, Gary TL, Bone LR. Using the precede-proceed model to apply health behavior 
theories. In: Glantz K, Rimer BK, Viswanath K. (eds.) Health Behavior and Health Education: Theory, 
Research, and Practice. 4th ed. San Franscisco: Jossey-Bass; 2008 p. 407-429.
20. de Vries H. An Integrated Approach for Understanding Health Behavior; The I-Change Model as 
an Example. Psychology and Behavioral Science. 2017;2(2):1-6. Available from: doi:10.19080/
PBSIJ.2017.02.555585.
21. Rosenstock IM. The Health Belief Model and Personal Health Behavior. Health Education & Behavior. 
1974;2(4):354–86. Available from: doi:10.1177/109019817400200405.
22. Ajzen I. The theory of planned behaviour: Reactions and reflections. Psychology & Health. 
2011;26(9):1113–1127. Available from: doi:10.1080/08870446.2011.613995.
23. Clavier C, de Leeuw E. Health Promotion and the Policy Process. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2013. 
Available from: doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658039.001.0001.
24. Fong GT, Cummings KM, Borland R, Hastings G, Hyland A, Giovino GA, et al. The conceptual framework 
of the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Policy Evaluation Project. Tobacco Control. 2006;15(3):3–11. 
Available from: doi:10.1136/tc.2005.015438.
25. Smith K. Beyond Evidence Based Policy in Public Health - The Interplay of Ideas. London: Palgrave 
McMillan; 2013. Available from: doi:10.1057/9781137026583.
26. Oliver TR. The politics of public health policy. Annual Review of Public Health. 2006;27:195–233. 
Available from: doi:10.1146/annurev.publhealth.25.101802.123126.
27. Pawson R. Evidence-based policy: a realist perspective. Thousand Oaks: Sage; 2006.
28. Wong G, Greenhalgh T, Westhorp G, Buckingham J, Pawson R. RAMESES publication standards: Realist 
syntheses. BMC Medicine. 2013;11(1):21. Available from: doi:10.1186/1741-7015-11-21.
29. Albaek E, Green-Pedersen C, Nielsen LB. Making tobacco consumption a political issue in the 
United States and Denmark: The dynamics of issue expansion in comparative perspective. 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice. 2007;9(1):1–20. Available from: 
doi:10.1080/13876980601145581.
30. Malterud K, Siersma VD, Guassora AD. Sample Size in Qualitative Interview Studies: Guided 
by Information Power. Qualitative Health Research. 2016;26(13):1753–1760. Available from: 
doi:10.1177/1049732315617444.
31. Sabatier PA. The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe. Journal of 
European Public Policy. 1998;5(1):98–130. Available from: doi:10.1080/13501768880000051.
32. Wood RS. Tobacco’s Tipping Point: The Master Settlement Agreement as a Focusing Event. Policy 
Studies Journal. 2006;34(3):419–436. Available from: doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2006.00180.x.
33. Thurmond VA. The point of triangulation. Journal of Nursing Scholarship. 2001;33(3):253–258. Available 
from: doi:10.1111/j.1547-5069.2001.00253.x.
34. Kekic L. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy. 2007. Available from: https://www.
economist.com/media/pdf/democracy_index_2007_v3.pdf [Accessed 20th November 2019].
35. The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2018: Me too? Political Participation, Protest and 
Democracy. New York: the economist Intelligence Unit; 2018.
8
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 158
158
Chapter 8
36. Soroka SN, Wlezien C. Degrees of democracy: Politics, public opinion, and policy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; 2010.
37. Samuels B, Glantz SA. The Politics of Local Tobacco Control. JAMA. 1991:16;266(15):2110–2117. 
Available from: doi:10.1001/jama.1991.03470150082035.
38. United Nations. List of signatories to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Webpage. 
Available from: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IX-
4&chapter=9&clang=_en [Accessed 20th November 2019].
39. Lopez AD, Collishaw NE, Piha T. A descriptive model of the cigarette epidemic in developed countries. 
Tobacco Control. 1994;3(3):242–247.
40. Edwards R. The problem of tobacco smoking. Bmj. 2004;328(7433):217-219. Available from: 
doi:10.1136/bmj.328.7433.217.
41. Kim S-H, Shanahan J. Stigmatizing Smokers: Public Sentiment Toward Cigarette Smoking and Its 
Relationship to Smoking Behaviors. Journal of Health Communication. 2003;8(4):343–367. Available 
from: doi:10.1080/10810730305723.
42. Lund M. Exploring smokers’ opposition to proposed tobacco control strategies. Nordic Studies on 
Alcohol and Drugs. 2016;33(4):321–34. Available from: doi:10.1515/nsad-2016-0027.
43. Lazuras L, Rodafinos A, Panagiotakos DB, Thyrian JR, John U, Polychronopoulos E. Support for 
smoke-free policies in a pro-smoking culture: Findings from the European survey on tobacco control 
attitudes and knowledge. International Journal of Public Health. 2009;54(6):403–408. Available from: 
doi:10.1007/s00038-009-0074-2.
44. European Commission. Special Eurobarometer 458 Report: Attitudes of Europeans towards tobacco 
and electronic cigarettes. Brussels: Directorate-General for Communication; 2017.
45. Van Hurck MM, Nuyts PAW, Monshouwer K, Kunst AE, Kuipers MAG. Impact of removing point-of-sale 
tobacco displays on smoking behaviour among adolescents in Europe: a quasi-experimental study. 
Tobacco Control. 2018;28(4):401-408. Available from: doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054271.
46. WHO. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2003.
47. McCambridge J, Morris S. Comparing alcohol with tobacco indicates that it is time to move beyond 
tobacco exceptionalism. European Journal of Public Health. 2019;29(2):200–201. Available from: 
doi:10.1093/eurpub/cky227.
48. Baum FE, Sanders DM, Fisher M, Anaf J, Freudenberg N, Friel S, et al. Assessing the health impact of 
transnational corporations: Its importance and a framework. Global Health. 2016;12(1):1–7. Available 
from: doi:10.1186/s12992-016-0164-x.
49. Moodie R, Stuckler D, Monteiro C, Sheron N, Neal B, Thamarangsi T, et al. Profits and pandemics: 
Prevention of harmful effects of tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-processed food and drink industries. 
Lancet. 2013;381(9867):670–679. Available from: doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(12)62089-3.
50. Collin J, Plotnikova E, Hill S. One unhealthy commodities industry? Understanding links across tobacco, 
alcohol and ultra-processed food manufacturers and their implications for tobacco control and the 
SDGS. Tobacco Induced Diseases. 2018;16(suppl 1):A80. Available from: doi:10.18332/tid/83806.
51. Brand DA, Saisana M, Rynn LA, Pennoni F, Lowenfels AB. Comparative analysis of alcohol control 
policies in 30 countries. PLoS Medicine. 2007;4(4):752–759. Available from: doi:10.1371/journal.
pmed.0040151.
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 159
159
General discussion
52. Taylor AL, Ibadat SD. An International Legal Strategy for Alcohol Control: Not a Framework 
Convention-at Least Not Yet. Addiction. 2013;108(3):450–55. Available from: doi:10.1111/j.1360-
0443.2012.03919.x.
53. Geneau R, Stuckler D, Stachenko S, McKee M, Ebrahim S, Basu S, et al. Raising the priority of preventing 
chronic diseases: A political process. Lancet. 2010;376(9753):1689–1698. Available from: doi:10.1016/
S0140-6736(10)61414-6.
54. Béland D. The Politics of Social Learning: Finance, Institutions, and Pension Reform in the United States 
and Canada. Governance. 2006;19(4):559–583. Available from: doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2006.00340.x.
55. Mackenbach J. Political determinants of health. European Journal of Public Health. 2014;24. Available 
from: doi:10.1093/eurpub/ckt183.
56. Chapman S, Wakefield M. Tobacco control advocacy in Australia: reflections on 30 years of progress. 
Health Education & Behavior. 2001;28(3):274–289. Available from: doi:10.1177/109019810102800303.
57. Cohen JE, Milio N, Rozier RG, Ferrence R, Ashley MJ, Goldstein AO. Political ideology and tobacco 
control. Tobacco Control. 2000;9(3):263–267. Available from: doi:10.1136/tc.9.3.263.
58. Siegel M, Doner L. Marketing Public Health. Gaithersburg: Aspen Publishers; 1998.
59. Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. National Prevention Agreement. The Hague: Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sport; 2018. Available from: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/
documenten/convenanten/2018/11/23/nationaal-preventieakkoord/nationaal-preventieakkoord.pdf 
[Accessed 20th November 2019].
60. Lynch J. Reframing Inequality? The Health Inequalities Turn as a Dangerous Frame Shift. Journal of 
Public Health. 2017;39(4): 653-660. Available from: doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdw140.
61. Willemsen MC, Fooks GJ. Tobacco industry access to policy elites and the implementation of Article 
5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Tobacco Control. 2019. Available from: 
doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2019-055251.
8
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 160
160
Abbreviations 
ABBREVIATIONS
ACF  Advocacy Coalition Framework
CEO  Chief executive officer
COPD  Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
ENSP  European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention
EU  European Union
FCTC  Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
ITC  International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Project
IQR  Interquartile range
MP  Member of Parliament
NGO  Non-governmental organization
POS  Point of sale
RAMESES Realist And Meta-narrative Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards
SES  Socio-economic status
SSCI  Social Sciences Citation Index
TAD  Tobacco Advertising Directive
TCS  Tobacco Control Scale
TPD  Tobacco Products Directive
US  United States
WHO  World Health Organization
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 161
161
Valorization addendum
VALORIZATION ADDENDUM
According to the Rathenau institute and the Dutch government, valorization refers to a “process 
of creating value from knowledge by making knowledge suitable and/or available for economic 
and/or societal use and translating that knowledge into products, services, processes and 
entrepreneurial activity” (Rathenau Institute, 2016).
The aim of this valorization addendum is to describe the societal relevance and impact of 
findings presented in this thesis. Five questions are answered: 1) What is the social and economic 
relevance of the research results 2) For which people, outside of academic circles, are your 
results of interest? 3) Are there actual research products in which your results are applied? 4) 
To what extent are these products innovative compared to existing products? And 5) How will 
these be implemented?
Relevance
As tobacco consumption causes diseases and premature deaths, the associated social harms 
resulting from human suffering are considerable (1). Comprehensive tobacco control policies 
have the potential to reduce smoking prevalence (2–4). More ambitious policies should be 
adopted in Europe to reduce smoking prevalence, to ultimately reduce death and disease and 
associated social harm (suffering ). In order to achieve this, civil society plays a crucial role. It 
needs to work effectively to foster tobacco control policies at the national level. This thesis had 
a dual focus: 1) examining the policy environment more precisely using cross national policy 
adoption designs (i.e.: determinants of policymaking) and 2) examining how civil society can 
improve itself. Both these aims may help civil society to work more effectively. When they 
become more effective, comprehensive evidence based policies may be more readily enacted 
as a result, smoking prevalence will then likely decrease, which causes less people to die and 
get sick, which will in turn reduce human suffering and associated costs for society (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Flowchart of hypothesized relationship between findings of this thesis and social and economic 
benefit
Secondly, in terms of economic relevance, tobacco consumption brings about enormous financial 
costs for societies because of high healthcare costs and absenteeism etc., even when taking 
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into account the considerable treasury income from tobacco excise duty (5). When smoking 
prevalence decreases, it will ultimately save society a great amount of money, which can be spent 
on alternative issues which may benefit the population (e.g. improving healthcare or education).
Target groups
More insight into tobacco control policymaking is relevant for various stakeholders outside 
academia. Most obviously, this refers to actors in civil society (tobacco control advocates) who 
benefit from a more detailed assessment of the policy environment and a list of characteristics 
that may help them to assess and improve the strength of their advocacy. As targeted end-users 
of the knowledge generated in this thesis, these advocates were actively consulted and involved 
during the project and most of the data was collected from them.
Next to civil society advocates, policymakers may benefit from findings presented in this thesis. 
As an example: in Chapter 3, we find that public support may be galvanized by presenting it in 
terms of child-protection. Policymakers that use this frame, may effectively bridge differences 
between opponents and proponents of big government and a governmental role in the domain 
of tobacco control. Furthermore, as the policy process is often called complex, policymakers 
that are relatively unexperienced with health issues that get tobacco control in their portfolio 
may read this thesis to get some more insight into the various aspects relevant to this domain.
Furthermore, the tobacco industry increasingly focuses on low- and middle-income countries in 
Asia and Africa as a market for their products, as European countries adopt stricter legislation 
over time (6). It is important for comprehensive tobacco control in such countries, that their 
governments understand the importance of avoiding interaction with the tobacco industry 
(7). This thesis will provide them with the general insight that tobacco control is a continuous 
tug-of-war between the tobacco industry and civil society. As civil society in these countries is 
typically weaker or completely absent, economic interests are likely to prevail over public health. 
Furthermore, tobacco control advocates in those countries may use the tool developed by us 
(Chapter 7) as a guide to establish or improve their partnerships to become more effective.
Lastly we must also be aware that the findings in this thesis may have unintended negative 
consequences, as tobacco industry representatives may also benefit from a more thorough 
assessment of the policy environment, and more insight in what contributes to the strength of 
their political opponents in this political domain.
Products
A tangible product which has resulted from the findings in this thesis, is the tool we developed 
to measure characteristics related to tobacco control partnership strength. This tool measures 
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such characteristics on three dimensions: resources (including connections to policymakers), 
partner characteristics, and partnership characteristics. It has a great potential to benefit 
population health and science, as the tool 1) can offer tobacco control advocates insights into 
the organization of their partnerships, 2) can offer starting points for establishing or improving 
tobacco control partnerships, 3) can be used as a benchmark to compare partnerships within 
and across European countries, 4) can be used to monitor changes in partnership organization 
over time, 5) can contribute to theory-building in the broader field of determinants of health 
partnership strength… Possible applications are numerous. Future scholars are invited to further 
develop this tool, preferably by testing its validity, or appointing relative weights to individual 
items or subscales to calculate ‘scores’ on which countries can be more easily compared.
Another relevant process worth considering is the data collection itself as possible intervention 
(8). Tobacco control advocates typically do not reflect much on their day-to-day activities and their 
approach is often largely intuitive (9). By asking them which factors they believe are associated 
with success in influencing national policy, they are forced to reflect on (the effectiveness of) 
their practices. This may lead them to work differently (hopefully more effectively), and the 
expert panel then functions as an informal intervention. This logic also extends to our interviews 
conducted for Chapter 4 and 5: it may be possible that discussing tobacco control in particular 
had an agenda-setting function for Members of Parliament and/or civil servants. If this is true, 
then this research as such can be considered a form of advocacy. For tobacco control advocates 
interviewed in this project, it may have had an effect as well: the focus on the case of a tobacco 
display ban may have primed interviewees to advocate for this specific policy measure. Filling 
out the tool eventually, as it was sent out through ENSP to all European partners, may also have 
changed their perceptions about what constitutes an effective partnership. Furthermore, we 
sent the partnerships individual country feedback, allowing them to compare themselves with 
partnerships across Europe and possibly, within their country.
This thesis itself also constitutes a product, which will be sent through the format of an e-book 
to all advocacy contacts that participated in this research, such as the Alliance for a Smoke-
free Netherlands, the DKFZ in Germany, and other ENSP colleagues. We will provide a German 
summary of this thesis as well, to overcome potential language issues.
Three additional ‘products’ have resulted from the SILNE-R project and the Trimbos institute. A 
SILNE-R group was created on researchgate.com (a website), in which references to published 
articles are shared. This group has 41 followers across various countries and disciplines. 
Furthermore, The Trimbos institute shared two online news items on its official website to 
disseminate the findings of Chapter 3 and 4 upon publication. They have also tweeted a link to 
these publications. These activities have likely boosted the number of downloads of the article 
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in Chapter 3 for example, which was 476 in the first year, of which 115 (24%) were emanating 
from IP addresses in The Netherlands.
Innovation
The tool developed and administered in Chapter 6 and 7 is the first ever attempt to operationalize 
and assess tobacco control partnership strength. Previous endeavors have focused on health 
partnerships in general, which sometimes included tobacco control partnerships, in addition to 
such partnerships in other domains (10,11). By assessing the characteristics related to tobacco 
control partnership strength specifically, characteristics that are specifically relevant for tobacco 
control can be determined. In other words: an approach that focuses on health partnerships 
in general, may not do justice to the idiosyncrasies of this particular policy domain. Although 
there are obvious parallels between tobacco and alcohol (a powerful industry, both are bad for 
health), there are also aspects that make them unique (12). For example: the social norm towards 
smoking is different from the social norm regarding alcohol, and the industry is irrefutably 
regarded an unreliable partner in formulating policy, something that remains debated in the 
field of alcohol policy in which voluntary agreements with the industry are still often accepted.
Planning and implementation
We have actually already ‘implemented’ our tool (e.g. administered it to tobacco control 
partnerships across and within EU countries). We hope that future scholars will further develop 
it in terms of reliability and possibly by assigning relative weights to the individual items.
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SUMMARY
Per year, 700,000 Europeans die from the consequences of tobacco consumption. Smoking 
causes a wide range of illnesses, including various types of cancer, cardiovascular diseases and 
respiratory diseases. In addition to its detrimental effect on public health, smoking causes a 
considerable economic burden to society. Policy measures can be enacted to address tobacco 
consumption, particularly through the MPOWER policy package provided by the World 
Health Organization through the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Although 
responsibility for tobacco control is partly devolved to European and local levels, a considerable 
part of the responsibility for tobacco control still rests at national levels. As a consequence, 
there is considerable variance in tobacco control policy comprehensiveness across countries. 
This variance is demonstrated by benchmarking studies such as the Tobacco Control Scale, which 
shows the number of implemented policy measures in a country and provides a total score per 
country. To understand why some countries have more comprehensive tobacco control policies 
than others, we must study the policy making process itself. Better insight into policymaking 
can provide tobacco control advocates with more opportunities to influence policy, which will 
ultimately benefit public health.
Theories of policymaking can be disaggregated into five core components of policymaking: 
societal factors, the role of institutions, agenda setting/framing, interest groups, and the role 
and transfer of ideas. The overall aim of this thesis is to examine what underlies the considerable 
variations in tobacco control policy comprehensiveness across European countries, by 
investigating these components.
Aims
The thesis addressed two specific aims:
1. To examine determinants of tobacco control policymaking in European countries
2. To examine which characteristics are related to tobacco control partnership strength 
and how European partnerships compare with regards to these characteristics.
The first aim was addressed in part I of this thesis.
In Chapter 2, we reviewed the scientific literature to evaluate what is known about the policy 
process of three youth access and exposure policies. Of all 200 investigated articles, only one 
article provided scientific evidence on the initial three phases of the policy process, as opposed 
to mere ‘anecdotal’ evidence. Based on this finding, we concluded that the policy process leading 
to the adoption of these policy measures is grossly understudied. We call on researchers to 
conduct more research on the initial phases of the process of tobacco control policymaking 
(agenda setting, policy formulation, policy legitimation).
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In Chapter 3, we found that support for the protection of children against tobacco was positively 
related to support for three prospective youth access and exposure policies. We examined this 
relationship for three groups known to be opposed towards tobacco control: smokers, opponents 
of a big government, and opponents of a governmental role in tobacco control. Although 
smokers always had less support for three future policy measures, there was a ‘child-effect’ in 
all investigated subgroups. These findings suggest that a ‘frame’ focusing on the protection of 
children against tobacco may be instrumental in raising support for tobacco control policies, 
even among more skeptical segments in society.
In Chapter 4, we investigated whether pro or anti-tobacco control interest groups have more 
influence on the policy process across six European countries. We discovered that the dominant 
frame of tobacco consumption and the arrangement of institutions are associated with the group 
that has a policy monopoly (i.e.: most influence on policymaking). In Ireland and Finland, for 
example, health groups have more influence than the tobacco industry on the tobacco control 
policy process. In these countries, tobacco consumption is understood as a health problem, 
tobacco control interest groups are plentiful and well-organized, the tobacco industry in terms of 
production and manufacture is largely gone, the health ministries play a leading role in tobacco 
control policymaking, governmental endgame strategies are in place, and FCTC Article 5.3 is 
strictly interpreted. A reversed image is observed in Germany and Italy, where the tobacco 
industry was observed to have more influence on tobacco control policy, compared to tobacco 
control groups. Belgium and The Netherlands had mixed profiles containing elements of both 
health and tobacco industry policy monopolies. When tobacco control advocates wish to 
challenge a tobacco industry policy monopoly, they may, besides focusing on framing, address 
the institutional arrangements that maintain and reinforce a policy monopoly by the tobacco 
industry.
In Chapter 5, we investigated lesson-drawing from other countries in tobacco control. We found 
that the German government does not engage in lesson-drawing. Other governments look at 
Australia for its global leadership in tobacco control, yet lessons from Australia are dismissed 
because it is ‘far away’ and ‘an island’. It appears that, except for Ireland, European governments 
tend to look at closer by and similar countries in Europe. These findings can be used by tobacco 
control advocates, who may choose best practice examples in tobacco control closer to their 
countries, or emphasize similarities in country or policy contexts with global leading countries.
The second aim was addressed in part II of this thesis: determinants of tobacco control 
partnership strength and a comparison of European partnerships regarding the prevalence of 
such characteristics.
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In Chapter 6, we explored through an expert panel with ten European tobacco control advocates, 
which characteristics are perceived to be related to tobacco control partnership strength. 
Ten characteristics were found: (1) financial independence from government, (2) expertise in 
research and advocacy, (3) an evidence informed approach, (4) access to nationally relevant 
data, (5) connections to policymakers, journalists, researchers, and other partnerships, (6) 
partner heterogeneity (7) conflict resolution, (8) a central coordinating office, (9) clear rules or 
statutes, and (10) a shared vision/consensus. Such characteristics may be used to establish new 
partnerships, to improve existing partnerships, or to assess and compare European partnerships 
with.
In Chapter 7, we assessed characteristics found to be related to tobacco control partnership 
strength, across 18 European partnerships. A 22-item tool was developed on three dimensions: 
resources (12 items), member characteristics (2 items), and partnerships characteristics (8 items). 
Of all investigated countries, 32% did not have a partnership. Across the assessed partnerships, 
some characteristics were highly prevalent, and some were not. This suggests that there is room 
for improvement of partnerships. Our tool could be used to practically monitor and improve 
partnerships.
What can we conclude from these studies?
Tobacco control partnerships, interest groups, alliances or coalitions are a central and 
indispensable part of the tobacco control policy process. Their effectiveness is determined by 
a number of internal partnership characteristics, including resources (national or international 
information, expertise, and connections) member characteristics (heterogeneity and volume) 
and partnership characteristics (governance, leadership, strategy, and conflict resolution). They 
play an important role in raising and demonstrating public support, pointing to foreign best 
practices, appealing to obligations from international treaties, and excluding the tobacco industry 
from the policy process. The effectiveness of these groups is however also influenced by factors 
in the broader policy environment, which vary across countries. These include the dominant 
frame of tobacco, the ideology of the ruling parties, the implementation of FCTC Article 5.3, and 
the centrality of the health ministry.
Strengths of the thesis
This thesis had some main strengths. Its focus is innovative within the tobacco control research 
field, as it investigates determinants of tobacco control policy adoption, instead of impacts of 
policies on populations. Furthermore, its approach is realist-inspired, which means that it focuses 
on how policymaking or advocacy works. It focuses on ‘inner workings’ or ‘mechanisms’ and 
takes, when possible, context into account. Furthermore, studies that compare more than two 
countries simultaneously are rare. The potential to reach general conclusions is however far 
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greater with a cross-country comparative approach. Such an approach can discover variables 
that are necessarily treated as constants in single-country case studies.
Implications for science
In line with findings of Chapter 2, we call on researchers to devote more attention to the tobacco 
control policy process. Primarily because we can then better understand country variations in 
tobacco control policy comprehensiveness. Furthermore, it is important for tobacco control 
advocates to have more insight into how policymaking works, to use the political arena more 
effectively. Future research could extend the explorative work on tobacco control advocacy in 
this thesis, focus more elaborately on political ideology, or focus on effective country-specific 
policy frames.
Implications for practice
Most studies in this thesis provide implications for tobacco control advocacy practice. We 
recommend advocates to enforce a stricter interpretation of FCTC Article 5.3, to make the 
health ministry responsible for tobacco control (for example in Germany), to establish or further 
develop the national tobacco control NGO community, to denormalize the tobacco industry, and 
to draw lessons from successful nearby and/or similar countries in tobacco control.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Jedes Jahr sterben 700.000 Menschen in Europa an den Folgen von Tabakkonsum. Rauchen 
verursacht eine Vielzahl von Krankheiten, einschließlich verschiedener Formen von Krebs, 
Herz-Kreislauf-Erkrankungen und Erkrankungen der Atemwege. Zusätzlich zu den schädlichen 
Auswirkungen auf die Volksgesundheit, verursacht Rauchen eine erhebliche wirtschaftliche 
Belastung für die Gesellschaft. Verschiedene politische Maßnahmen können beschlossen werden, 
um Tabakkonsum in Angriff zu nehmen, besonders mit Hilfe des MPOWER Maßnahmenpakets, 
welches von der Weltgesundheitsorganisation im Rahmenübereinkommen zur Eindämmung 
des Tabakgebrauchs (FCTC) angeboten wird. Obwohl die Verantwortlichkeit für Tabakkontrolle 
teilweise europäischen und lokalen Parteien zufällt, liegt doch ein erheblicher Teil der 
Verantwortlichkeit für Tabakkontrolle bei nationalen Parteien. Daraus ergibt sich, dass es 
bedeutende Unterschiede zwischen Ländern im Umfang ihrer Tabakkontrollmaßnahmen 
gibt. Diese Unterschiede werden in Benchmarkingstudien wie der Tobacco Control Scale 
aufgezeigt. Diese zeigt die Anzahl der eingeführten Kontrollmaßnahmen in jedem Land und 
erstellt außerdem einen Gesamtwert pro Land. Um verstehen zu können warum einige Länder 
umfangreichere Tabakkontrollmaßnahmen handhaben als andere, muss man den Prozess zur 
Entstehung von Kontrollmaßnahmen untersuchen. Ein besseres Verständnis für die Entstehung 
von Kontrollmaßnahmen kann Verfechtern von Tabakkontrolle mehr Möglichkeiten bieten die 
Politik zu beeinflussen, was schlussendlich der Volksgesundheit zu Gute kommen wird.
Theorien zur Entstehung von Kontrollmaßnahmen können in fünf Kernkomponenten aufgeteilt 
werden: gesellschaftliche Faktoren, die Rolle von Institutionen, das Setzen konkreter 
Themenschwerpunkte, Interessensgruppen sowie die Rolle und der Transfer von Ideen. Das 
allgemeine Ziel dieser Thesis ist, zu untersuchen, was den großen Unterschieden im Umfang 
der Tabakkontrollmaßnahmen zwischen europäischen Ländern zugrunde liegt, indem diese 
Komponenten genauer erforscht werden.
Zielsetzungen
Die Thesis verfolgt zwei spezifische Zielsetzungen:
1. Es soll untersucht werden, welche Determinanten bei der Entstehung von Maßnahmen 
zur Tabakkontrolle eine Rolle spielen
2. Es soll untersucht werden, welche Merkmale zu der Stärke von Koalitionen in der 
Tabakkontrolle in Bezug stehen und wie europäische Koalitionen sich in diesen Merkmalen 
unterscheiden
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Die erste Zielsetzung wird in Teil I dieser Thesis behandelt.
In Kapitel 2 haben wir die wissenschaftliche Literatur untersucht, um zu beurteilen was über 
die Entstehungsprozesse von drei Maßnahmen zur Tabakkontrolle bei Jugendlichen bekannt 
ist: Das Verdecken von Tabakprodukten in Verkaufsstellen, das Erhöhen der Altersgrenze zum 
Verkauf von Tabak und das Einschränken der Anzahl und der Art der Verkaufsstellen. Von allen 
200 untersuchten Artikeln erbrachte nur ein einziger einen wissenschaftlichen Beweis für die 
ersten drei Phasen der Entstehung von Maßnahmen, im Gegensatz zu rein „anekdotischem“ 
Beweis. Basierend auf diesen Ergebnissen schlussfolgerten wir, dass der Maßnahmenprozess, 
der zur Übernahme dieser Maßnahmen führt, viel zu wenig untersucht wird. Wir rufen 
Wissenschaftler dazu auf, mehr Forschung zu den ersten Phasen des Prozesses der Entstehung 
von Tabakkontrollmaßnahmen (das Setzen konkreter Themenschwerpunkte, Formulierung und 
Legitimation der Maßnahmen) zu betreiben.
Ein Ergebnis in Kapitel 3 ist, dass Befürwortung für den Schutz von Kindern gegen Tabak 
positiv mit der Befürwortung für drei zukünftige Maßnahmen für Jugendliche gegen Zugang 
und Bloßstellung von Tabak zusammenhing. Wir haben diesen Zusammenhang in drei Gruppen 
untersucht, die Tabakkontrolle bekanntermaßen ablehnen: Raucher, Gegner von großen 
Regierungen und Gegner von einer Rolle der Regierung in der Tabakkontrolle. Obwohl Raucher 
die drei zukünftigen Maßnahmen alle weniger befürworteten, gab es in allen untersuchten 
Untergruppen einen „Kind-Effekt“. Diese Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass ein „Frame“, 
der den Schutz von Kindern gegen Tabak fokussiert, hilfreich sein kann um Befürwortung für 
Kontrollmaßnahmen zu stärken, selbst in den skeptischeren Teilen der Bevölkerung.
In Kapitel 4 haben wir untersucht, ob Befürworter oder Gegner von Tabakkontrolle mehr 
Einfluss auf den Entstehungsprozess von Kontrollmaßnahmen in sechs europäischen Ländern 
haben. Das diesbezügliche Ergebnis ist, dass die Art wie Tabakgebrauch von der Regierung 
dargestellt wird und die Art wie Institutionen eingerichtet sind, damit zusammenhängen welche 
Interessensgruppe den größten Einfluss auf den Entstehungsprozess von Kontrollmaßnahmen 
hat. Zum Beispiel haben Gesundheitsorganisationen in Irland und Finnland einen größeren 
Einfluss auf den Entstehungsprozess als die Tabakindustrie. In diesen Ländern wird Tabakkonsum 
als Gesundheitsproblem verstanden, Interessensgruppen von Befürwortern von Tabakkontrolle 
sind stark vertreten und gut organisiert, die Tabakindustrie ist bezüglich Produktion und 
Manufaktur größtenteils verschwunden, die Gesundheitsministerien nehmen eine Führungsrolle 
in der Tabakkontrolle ein, die Regierung setzt „Endgame“-Strategien ein, und Artikel 5.3 der 
FCTC wird streng ausgelegt. Ein gegensätzliches Bild zeigt sich in Deutschland und Italien, wo 
die Tabakindustrie im Vergleich zu Befürwortern von Tabakkontrolle einen größeren Einfluss auf 
den Entstehungsprozess von Tabakkontrollmaßnahmen hat. Belgien und die Niederlande zeigten 
gemischte Profile, die Elemente von sowohl Gesundheits- als auch Tabakindustriemonopolen 
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aufwiesen. Wenn Befürworter von Tabakkontrolle ein Monopol der Tabakindustrie anfechten 
wollen, sollten sie nicht nur die Darstellungsweise beachten, sondern sich auch mit den 
Institutionen befassen, die ein solches Monopol aufrechterhalten und stärken.
In Kapitel 5 haben wir untersucht, wie Regierungen Lehren ziehen aus der Tabakkontrolle 
in anderen Ländern. Ein Ergebnis ist, dass Deutschland sich nicht am Ausland orientiert, um 
Lehren aus den Erfahrungen anderer Länder zu ziehen. Andere Regierungen orientieren sich an 
Australien, da es weltweit die Führungsrolle in der Tabakkontrolle einnimmt. Allerdings werden 
Erfahrungen aus Australien oft verworfen, weil es „weit weg“ und „eine Insel“ ist. Es scheint als 
würden sich europäische Regierungen, mit Ausnahme der irischen, an geographisch näheren 
und ähnlicheren Ländern in Europa orientieren. Diese Ergebnisse können von Befürwortern von 
Tabakkontrolle genutzt werden, indem sie bewährte Verfahren in der Tabakkontrolle, die näher 
am eigenen Land sind als Beispiel nutzen, oder indem sie die Ähnlichkeiten der Länder oder 
Politiklandschaften der führenden Länder mit dem eigenen Land betonen.
Die zweite Zielsetzung wird in Teil II dieser Thesis behandelt. Diese lautet: Determinanten der 
Stärke von Koalitionen in der Tabakkontrolle definieren und einen Vergleich von europäischen 
Koalitionen bezüglich der Prävalenz solcher Merkmale durchführen.
In Kapitel 6 haben wir mithilfe eines Expertenpanels von zehn europäischen Befürwortern 
von Tabakkontrolle untersucht, welche Merkmale in ihrer Wahrnehmung mit der Stärke von 
Koalitionen in der Tabakkontrolle zusammenhängen. Zehn Merkmale wurden identifiziert: (1) 
finanzielle Unabhängigkeit von der Regierung, (2) Fachwissen in Forschung und Fürsprache, 
(3) ein auf Beweisen basierendes Vorgehen, (4) Zugang zu national relevanten Daten, (5) 
Verbindungen zu Entscheidungsträgern, Journalisten, Wissenschaftlern und anderen Koalitionen, 
(6) Partnerheterogenität, (7) Konfliktlösungen, (8) ein zentral koordinierendes Büro, (9) klare 
Regeln oder Statuten und (10) eine gemeinsame Vision/Konsens. Solche Merkmale können 
genutzt werden, um neue Koalitionen aufzubauen, bestehende Koalitionen zu verbessern oder 
um zu untersuchen inwiefern diese Merkmale innerhalb europäischer Koalitionen vorhanden 
sind.
In Kapitel 7 haben wir in 18 europäischen Koalitionen die Merkmale gemessen, die mit der Stärke 
von Koalitionen in der Tabakkontrolle zusammenhängen. Hierzu wurde ein Instrument mit 22 
Fragen entwickelt, welches drei Dimensionen umfasst: Hilfsmittel (12 Fragen), Merkmale der 
Mitglieder (2 Fragen) und Merkmale der Koalitionen (8 Fragen). Von den untersuchten Ländern 
bestand in 32% keine Koalition. Verteilt über die verschiedenen Koalitionen waren einige 
Merkmale stärker vorhanden als andere. Das deutet darauf hin, dass es Verbesserungspotenzial 
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für die Koalitionen gibt. Unser Instrument könnte zur praxisorientierten Kontrolle genutzt 
werden, um die Koalitionen zu verbessern.
Fazit aus diesen Studien
Koalitionen in der Tabakkontrolle, Interessensgruppen, Allianzen oder Verbünde sind ein zentraler 
und unverzichtbarer Bestandteil des Entstehungsprozesses von Tabakkontrollmaßnahmen. Ihre 
Effektivität wird von einer Anzahl interner Koalitionsmerkmalen bestimmt, wie zum Beispiel 
Hilfsmittel (nationale und internationale Informationen, Fachwissen und Verbindungen), 
Merkmale der Mitglieder (Heterogenität und Umfang) und Merkmale der Koalition (Führung, 
Leitung, Strategie und Konfliktlösung). Sie spielen eine wichtige Rolle, um die öffentliche 
Befürwortung zu erhöhen, bewährte Verfahren aus dem Ausland dazustellen, auf Verpflichtungen 
aus internationalen Abkommen hinzuweisen und die Tabakindustrie aus dem Entstehungsprozess 
von Kontrollmaßnahmen auszuschließen. Die Effektivität dieser Gruppen wird allerdings auch 
noch von anderen Faktoren der breiteren politischen Landschaft beeinflusst, welche sich 
zwischen den Ländern unterscheiden. Diese beinhalten die vorherrschende Auffassung von 
Tabak, die Ideologie der regierenden Parteien, die Umsetzung von FCTC Artikel 5.3 und die 
Zentralität des Gesundheitsministeriums.
Stärken dieser Thesis
Diese Thesis beinhaltet einige wesentliche Stärken. Ihr Fokus ist innovativ innerhalb des 
Forschungsbereichs Tabakkontrolle, da sie Determinanten von Verabschiedungen von 
Tabakkontrollmaßnahmen untersucht, anstelle der Wirkung von Kontrollmaßnahmen auf die 
Population. Außerdem ist das Vorgehen „realistisch“ inspiriert, was bedeutet, dass es fokussiert 
wie Kontrollmaßnahmen und deren Fürsprache entstehen und gelingen. Die Schwerpunkte 
sind die „innere Verarbeitung“ oder „Mechanismen“ und berücksichtigen, wenn möglich, 
den Kontext. Des Weiteren sind Studien, die mehr als zwei Länder miteinander vergleichen 
selten. Das Potenzial für allgemein gültige Schlussfolgerungen ist allerdings viel größer bei 
solchen Ländervergleichsstudien. Ein solches Vorgehen kann Variablen aufdecken, die in 
Einzelländerstudien notwendigerweise als Konstante behandelt werden müssen.
Auswirkungen auf die Wissenschaft
Basierend auf den Ergebnissen in Kapitel 2 rufen wir Wissenschaftler dazu auf, dem 
Entstehungsprozess von Tabakkontrollmaßnahmen mehr Beachtung zu schenken. Dies ist 
vor allem wichtig, um die Variationen im Umfang von Tabakkontrollmaßnahmen besser zu 
verstehen. Außerdem ist es für Befürworter von Tabakkontrolle wichtig, mehr Einsicht in den 
Entstehungsprozess zu bekommen, um die politische Arena besser nutzen zu können. Zukünftige 
Forschungsprojekte könnten die explorative Arbeit zur Fürsprache in der Tabakkontrolle 
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ausweiten und sich dabei ausführlicher auf politische Ideologien konzentrieren oder effektive 
länderspezifische Rahmen für Maßnahmen fokussieren.
Auswirkungen auf die Praxis
Die meisten Studien in dieser Thesis zeigen Auswirkungen für die Praxis der Fürsprache in der 
Tabakkontrolle. Wir empfehlen Befürwortern für eine strengere Interpretation von FCTC Artikel 
5.3 zu plädieren, das Gesundheitsministerium für Tabakkontrolle verantwortlich zu machen 
(zum Beispiel in Deutschland), die nationale Gemeinschaft nichtstaatlicher Organisationen 
für Tabakkontrolle aufzubauen oder zu stärken, die Tabakindustrie zu denormalisieren und 
Lehren aus erfolgreichen geographisch nahen und/oder ähnlichen Ländern bezüglich ihrer 
Tabakkontrolle zu ziehen
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 175
175
Samenvatting
SAMENVATTING
Per jaar sterven 700.000 Europeanen aan de gevolgen van tabaksgebruik. Roken veroorzaakt 
een breed scala aan ziekten, waaronder verschillende soorten kanker, hart- en vaatziekten 
en aandoeningen van de luchtwegen. Naast het schadelijke effect op de volksgezondheid, 
veroorzaakt roken een aanzienlijke economische last voor de samenleving. Beleid kan worden 
geïmplementeerd om roken aan te pakken, zoals bijvoorbeeld de maatregelen die worden 
voorgesteld door de Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie via het Kaderverdrag Tabaksontmoediging 
(FCTC). Hoewel de verantwoordelijkheid voor tabaksbeleid deels ligt bij de Europese Unie of bij 
lokale niveaus, wordt een aanzienlijk deel van het tabaksbeleid op nationaal niveau besloten. 
Dit is een van de redenen dat er behoorlijke verschillen zijn tussen landen met betrekking 
tot de veelomvattendheid van hun tabaksbeleid. Om te begrijpen waarom sommige landen 
een ambitieuzer tabaksbeleid voeren dan andere landen, moet het beleidsvormingsproces 
nader worden bestudeerd. Meer inzicht in hoe beleid tot stand komt kan gezondheids-
belangenbehartigers meer kansen bieden om het beleid te beïnvloeden, wat uiteindelijk ten 
goede zal komen aan de volksgezondheid.
Theorieën over beleidsvorming kunnen worden onderverdeeld in vijf kerncomponenten: 
maatschappelijke factoren, de rol van instituties, agendering/framing, belangengroepen en de 
rol en overdracht van kennis en ideeën. Het algemene doel van dit proefschrift is om met behulp 
van deze componenten te onderzoeken wat ten grondslag ligt aan de aanzienlijke variatie in 
tabaksbeleid tussen Europese landen.
Doelstellingen
Dit proefschrift richtte zich op twee specifieke doelen:
1. Onderzoek naar de determinanten van tabaksbeleid in Europese landen
2. Onderzoek naar welke kenmerken gerelateerd zijn aan de sterkte van tabaks-
ontmoedigingscoalities en hoe Europese coalities zich tot elkaar verhouden met betrekking 
tot de prevalentie van deze kenmerken.
Het eerste doel werd behandeld in deel I van dit proefschrift.
In Hoofdstuk 2 hebben we de wetenschappelijke literatuur bestudeerd om te kijken wat er 
bekend is over het beleidsproces van drie beleidsmaatregelen om roken bij jongeren te 
ontmoedigen. Van alle 200 onderzochte artikelen gaf slechts één artikel wetenschappelijk 
bewijs over de eerste drie fasen van het beleidsproces met betrekking tot een uitstalverbod 
voor tabaksproducten, in tegenstelling tot puur ‘anekdotisch’ bewijs gevonden in de andere 
artikelen. Op basis van deze bevinding hebben we geconcludeerd dat het beleidsproces met 
betrekking tot deze maatregelen te weinig is onderzocht. We roepen daarom onderzoekers op 
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om meer onderzoek te doen naar de eerste fasen van het beleidsvormingsproces (agendering, 
formulering, legitimering) bij tabaksontmoediging.
In Hoofdstuk 3 hebben we gevonden dat steun voor het beschermen van kinderen tegen tabak 
positief samenhangt met steun voor drie toekomstige beleidsmaatregelen. We onderzochten 
deze relatie bij drie subgroepen waarvan bekend is dat ze onwelwillend zijn ten opzichte van 
tabaksbeleid: rokers, tegenstanders van een grote overheid en tegenstanders van een sterke 
overheidsrol in het tabaksdomein. Hoewel rokers altijd minder steun bleven hebben voor 
deze drie toekomstige beleidsmaatregelen, hadden mensen in alle groepen meer steun voor 
beleidsmaatregelen als zij vonden dat kinderen moeten worden beschermd tegen tabak. Deze 
bevindingen suggereren dat een communicatie- ‘frame’ dat gericht is op de bescherming van 
kinderen tegen tabak, van belang zou kunnen zijn om steun voor (toekomstig) tabaksbeleid te 
vergroten, zelfs in meer onwelwillende segmenten van de samenleving.
In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we onderzocht of gezondheids-belangenbehartigers of de tabaksindustrie 
meer invloed hebben/heeft op het beleidsproces in zes Europese landen. We vonden dat de 
manier waarop tabaksgebruik wordt ‘geframed’ (ingekaderd) door de overheid en de manier 
waarop instituties zijn geordend, samenhangen met welke belangengroep het meeste invloed 
heeft op het tabaksbeleid. In Ierland en Finland hebben gezondheids-belangenbehartigers 
bijvoorbeeld meer invloed op het tabaksbeleid dan de tabaksindustrie. In deze landen wordt 
tabaksgebruik onmiskenbaar beschouwd als een gezondheidsprobleem, is er een goed 
ontwikkelde gemeenschap van Niet Gouvernementele Organisaties (NGO’s), is de tabaksindustrie 
qua productie en fabricage grotendeels uit het land verdwenen, spelen de gezondheidsministeries 
een leidende rol in het ontwikkelen van tabaksbeleid, zijn er eindspelstrategieën vanuit 
de overheid van kracht en wordt FCTC-artikel 5.3 strikt geïnterpreteerd. Een grotendeels 
tegengesteld beeld is zichtbaar in Duitsland en Italië, waar we vaststelden dat de tabaksindustrie 
meer invloed had op het tabaksbeleid dan belangenbehartigers van de gezondheidszijde. 
België en Nederland zaten tussen deze twee extremen in en hadden gemengde profielen 
die elementen bevatten van zowel gezondheidsmonopolies als tabaksindustriemonopolies. 
Wanneer belangenbehartigers aan de gezondheidszijde een monopolie van de industrie willen 
uitdagen, kunnen zij, naast zich te richten op effectieve ‘framing’, de instituties aanpakken die 
een monopolie bekrachtigen en in stand houden.
In Hoofdstuk 5 hebben we onderzocht hoe overheden leren van voorbeelden uit het buitenland. 
We hebben geconcludeerd dat de Duitse overheid nauwelijks naar het buitenland kijkt voor lessen 
binnen tabaksontmoediging. De andere regeringen (België, Finland, Ierland en Nederland) kijken 
zonder uitzondering naar Australië voor zijn wereldwijde leiderschap in tabaksontmoediging. 
Lessen uit Australië worden echter ook gemakkelijk weer verworpen, omdat het “ver weg” 
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en “een eiland” is. De bevindingen suggereren dat, met uitzondering van Ierland, Europese 
regeringen de neiging hebben om naar landen te kijken die dichtbij liggen en vergelijkbaar zijn. 
De bevindingen kunnen worden gebruikt door gezondheids-belangenbehartigers. Zij kunnen 
bewuster goede voorbeelden dichtbij huis kiezen, of overeenkomsten met de wereldwijd 
leidende landen in tabaksontmoediging sterker benadrukken, bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot 
landkenmerken of de beleidscontext.
Het tweede doel werd behandeld in deel II van dit proefschrift: kenmerken die samenhangen 
met de sterkte van tabaksontmoedigingscoalities en een vergelijking van Europese coalities ten 
aanzien van de prevalentie van zulke kenmerken.
In Hoofdstuk 6 hebben we middels een deskundigenpanel met tien Europese gezondheids-
belangenbehartigers onderzocht welke kenmerken samenhangen met de sterkte van 
tabaksontmoedigingscoalities. We vonden tien kenmerken: (1) financiële onafhankelijkheid 
van de overheid, (2) expertise op het gebied van onderzoek en belangenbehartiging, (3) een 
evidence-based benadering, (4) toegang tot nationaal relevante informatie, (5) connecties met 
beleidsmakers, journalisten, onderzoekers, en andere coalities, (6) partnerheterogeniteit (7) 
goede conflictoplossing, (8) een centraal coördinatiebureau, (9) duidelijke regels of statuten, en 
(10) een gedeelde visie/consensus. Deze kenmerken kunnen worden gebruikt om nieuwe coalities 
mee op te richten, bestaande coalities mee te verbeteren, of om na te gaan wat de prevalentie 
van deze kenmerken is bij Europese tabaksontmoedigingscoalities.
In Hoofdstuk 7 hebben we bij 18 Europese tabaksontmoedigingscoalities vastgesteld hoeveel 
kenmerken zij hebben die samenhangen met hun sterkte. We ontwikkelden een instrument met 22 
items op drie dimensies: middelen (12 items), kenmerken van leden (2 items) en coalitiekenmerken 
(8 items). Van alle onderzochte landen had 32% geen tabaksontmoedigingscoalitie. Bepaalde 
kenmerken kwamen vaker voor bij Europese tabaksontmoedigingscoalities dan anderen, wat 
suggereert dat er ruimte is voor verbetering van sommige coalities. Ons instrument kan gebruikt 
worden om tabaksontmoedigingscoalities te monitoren en eventueel te versterken.
Wat kunnen we concluderen uit deze studies?
Belangengroepen in de maatschappij (bijvoorbeeld coalities, partnerships, allianties, etc.) zijn een 
centraal en onmisbaar onderdeel van het tabaksbeleidsproces. Hun effectiviteit wordt bepaald 
door een aantal interne coalitiekenmerken, waaronder middelen (nationale of internationale 
informatie, expertise en connecties), kenmerken van leden (heterogeniteit en volume) en 
coalitiekenmerken (bestuur, leiderschap, strategie en conflictoplossing). Belangengroepen 
spelen een belangrijke rol bij het verhogen en tonen van maatschappelijke steun voor 
beleidsmaatregelen, het wijzen op goede voorbeelden uit het buitenland, het appelleren 
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aan verplichtingen in het kader van internationale verdragen (Artikel 5.3 van de FCTC) en het 
excluderen van de tabaksindustrie van het beleidsproces. De effectiviteit van deze groepen 
wordt echter ook beïnvloed door factoren in de bredere beleidsomgeving, die van land tot land 
kunnen verschillen. Hieronder vallen onder andere de dominante ‘framing’ van tabaksgebruik, 
de ideologie van de regerende partijen, de interpretatie van Artikel 5.3 van de FCTC en de rol 
die ministeries van volksgezondheid spelen in het beleidsproces.
Sterke punten van het proefschrift
Dit proefschrift kende een aantal sterke punten. De focus is innovatief binnen het 
tabaksonderzoek, omdat het zich richt op determinanten van beleidsvorming, in plaats van op 
effecten van beleid op individuen of de bevolking. Bovendien heeft het proefschrift een ‘realistisch 
geïnspireerde benadering’, wat inhoudt dat het onderzoek zich richt op hoe beleidsvorming of 
belangenbehartiging werkt. Het richt zich op ‘innerlijke werkingen’ of ‘mechanismen’ en houdt 
waar mogelijk rekening met de context. Bovendien zijn beleidsstudies waarin meer dan twee 
landen met elkaar vergeleken worden schaars. Het vermogen om tot algemene conclusies te 
komen is veel groter bij een landen-vergelijkende aanpak. Zo’n aanpak kan variabelen ontdekken 
die noodzakelijkerwijs als constanten worden gezien bij studies binnen enkele landen.
Implicaties voor de wetenschap
In overeenstemming met de bevindingen van hoofdstuk 2 roepen we onderzoekers op meer 
aandacht te besteden aan determinanten van beleidsvorming binnen tabaksontmoediging. 
In de eerste plaats, omdat we dan de verschillen tussen landen in de veelomvattendheid 
van hun tabaksbeleid beter kunnen begrijpen. Verder is het belangrijk dat gezondheids-
belangenbehartigers meer inzicht krijgen in hoe beleidsvorming werkt, om de politieke arena 
effectiever te kunnen gebruiken. Toekomstig onderzoek zou het verkennend onderzoek naar 
belangenbehartiging in dit proefschrift kunnen uitbreiden, zich kunnen richten op politieke 
ideologie binnen tabaksontmoediging of op effectieve landspecifieke beleids-‘frames’.
Implicaties voor de praktijk
Verschillende studies in dit proefschrift hebben direct implicaties voor de praktijk van 
gezondheids-belangenbehartiging. We bevelen belangenbehartigers aan om een  striktere 
interpretatie van Artikel 5.3 van de FCTC af te dwingen, om ministeries van volksgezondheid 
verantwoordelijk te maken voor tabaksbeleid (bijvoorbeeld in Duitsland), om nationale NGO-
gemeenschappen of coalities voor tabaksontmoediging op te richten of om deze verder te 
versterken, om de tabaksindustrie te denormaliseren en om lering te trekken uit succesvolle 
nabijgelegen en/of vergelijkbare landen op het gebied van tabaksontmoediging.
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Appendix 1
APPENDIX 1: TOPIC LIST FOR INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR 
CHAPTER 4 AND CHAPTER 5
Main Questions Possible additional questions
1. Can you tell me something about 
how the current status of the POS 
display ban in [country]?
2. Is it discussed in parliament? 
Why (not?)
1. How? Why?
Per country there are usually two 
sides when it comes to tobacco 
control measures: a side that tries 
to promote more stringent tobacco 
control measures (the health-side), 
and a side that tries to prevent 
or delay more stringent tobacco 
control measures (the tobacco side).
3. What can you tell me about the 
health side in [country]?
4. What can you tell me about the 
pro-tobacco side in [country]?
1. Are they organized? How?
2. Can you tell me something about their 
resources? E.g. money, size, expertise?
3. What kind of organizations are part of 
this side?
4. Does the health-side collect data about 
smoking prevalence and public support? 
Why?
5. Is there a reasoning behind a POS 
display ban (both sides?) Arguments?
6. Do all parties at the health-side have 
the same beliefs about a POS display ban? 
As a policy solution?
7. Is the POS display ban a priority of the 
health-side? Why (not)?
8. What can you tell me about the 
strategy of the health-side to realize a POS 
display ban?
9. What can you tell me about the strategy 
of the tobacco-side to block a POS display 
ban?
5. What can you tell me about 
the influence of both sides on the 
policy process surrounding the POS 
display ban?
1. Do you think one of the sides exerts 
more influence on the policy process than 
the other? How? Why?
6. How do NGO’s talk about (frame) 
a POS display ban?
1. Does the government adopt one of 
these frames? Can you give an example?
7. How does the tobacco industry 
talk about (frame) a POS display 
ban?
Clarifying questions
Can you tell me a  
bit more about that?
Can you give an 
example?
How?
Why?
Can you tell me a bit 
more about that?
Can you give an 
example?
How?
Why?
Can you tell me a bit 
more about that?
Can you give an 
example?
How?
Why?
541938-L-bw-Kuijpers
Processed on: 10-3-2020 PDF page: 185
185
Appendix 1
Main Questions Possible additional questions
8. What can you tell me about 
the general ideological outlook of 
the government when it comes to 
smoking?
1. To what extent do you think is related 
to the influence both sides have on the 
policy process of the POS display ban?
2. Do you think that ideology plays a role 
in the policy process? How?
9. Do you think there are country-
specific characteristics that are 
of influence on tobacco control in 
[country]?
10. To what extent are public 
parties incorporated in the policy 
process (of a POS display ban)?
1. Who has access to the policy process?
2. Are there rules (explicit or implicit) 
for who can or cannot access the policy 
process? (FCTC 5.3)
3. Can everybody get access to the policy 
process?
4. Do you think that one of the two sides 
has more access to the policy process 
than the other?
11. Can you tell me something 
about the administrative capacity 
of the civil servants that work on 
tobacco? The ministry?
1. Is there a separate unit that works on 
tobacco?
2. How many people work on the topic?
12. What role does public support 
play in relation to a POS display 
ban?
13. Can you tell me how important 
the tobacco sector is for the 
national economy?
1. Do you think this is related to the 
influence the tobacco-side has on politics? 
How?
2. Do you think this affects the 
progression of a POS display ban?
14. Did the government look 
abroad to other country 
experiences with a POS display 
ban?
1. What countries? Why these countries?
15. To what extent do you think 
other tobacco control policies has 
had an influence on the adoption of 
the POS display ban?
1. What policies?
2. Why these policies?
3. How?
Clarifying questions
Can you tell me a  
bit more about that?
Can you give an 
example?
How?
Why?
Can you tell me a bit 
more about that?
Can you give an 
example?
How?
Why?
Can you tell me a bit 
more about that?
Can you give an 
example?
How?
Why?
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APPENDIX 2: THE TOBACCO CONTROL PARTNERSHIP TOOL 
DEVELOPED IN CHAPTER 7
Subcategory # Item (score) Clarification
Financial 
independence
1. The partnership receives structural 
funding ¹ from the national 
government.
1 Structural funding refers to funding 
on a weekly/monthly/yearly basis, as 
opposed to incidental funding (e.g. for 
one or a few specific projects).□ Yes, it does receive funding (0)
□ No, it does not receive funding 
(1)
Optional Comments:
Expertise 2. The partnership includes 
professional scientists¹ who are 
able to interpret² and appreciate³ 
scientific information.
1 Professional scientists are 
professionals which are scientifically 
trained (i.e.: received education) and 
have ample experience in this field.
2 Interpreting in this case refers to for 
example understanding the methods, 
results and conclusions of scientific 
information.
3 Appreciating refers to for example 
appreciating the reliability, validity, 
quality, generalizability and 
implications of scientific information.
□ Yes (1)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
3. The partnership includes 
professional communication 
experts¹.
1 Professional communication experts 
are professionals which are formally 
trained (i.e.: received education) in the 
field of communication and/or who 
have ample experience in this field.
□ Yes (1)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
4. The partnership includes 
professional lobbyists¹.
1 Professional lobbyists are 
professionals formally trained (i.e.: 
received education) in the field of 
lobbying (influencing public policy) 
and/or who have experience in this 
field.
□ Yes (1)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
Re
so
ur
ce
s
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Subcategory # Item (score) Clarification
Information 5. The partnership’s messages and 
policy proposals are informed by 
scientific evidence¹.
1 Informed by scientific evidence 
means that messages communicated 
to policymakers and the public have a 
sound evidence base. Policy proposals 
(e.g. specific policy instruments) 
are scientifically evaluated against 
scientific data and insights.
□ Yes, completely (1)
□ Yes, partly (0.5)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
6. The partnership has access to 
information¹ on the following aspects 
of the national situation (multiple 
answers possible):
1 Information refers to research 
reports or scientific articles relevant to 
the national situation.
□ Smoking prevalence and trends 
(1)
□ Tobacco-related morbidity and 
mortality (1)
□ Effectiveness of policy measures 
(1)
□ The economic burden of tobacco 
use (1)
□ Public attitudes towards tobacco 
control (1)
□ Tobacco industry presence and 
lobbying (1)
□ Attitudes of individual 
policymakers or parties towards 
tobacco control (1)
Optional Comments:
7. The partnership has a direct 
influence¹ on the research agenda of 
scientific organizations that fund or 
carry out research.
1 direct influence refers to having an 
influence on what type of research is 
being carried out within the country. 
For example: if there is a need for a 
country-specific evaluation of the 
effectiveness of plain packaging, such 
a study could be stimulated or even 
sponsored by the partnership.
□ Yes, a lot of influence (1)
□ Yes, some influence (0.5)
□ No, no influence (0)
Optional Comments:
Re
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Relationships 8. The partnership has working 
relationships¹ with at least one 
Member of Parliament, with 
functional contacts at least once in 
every 6 months.
1 Working relationships refer to 
professional relationships, with 
functional contacts that are mutually 
reinforced (sending and receiving 
e-mails, calling on the phone, 
professional meetings, etc.). Seeing 
and talking to MPs occasionally at 
unplanned events does not qualify as a 
working relationship.
□ Yes (1)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
9. The partnership has working 
relationships¹ with the relevant 
civil servants of the ministry that is 
primarily responsible for tobacco 
control², with functional contacts at 
least once in every 3 months.
1 Working relationships refer 
to professional relationships, 
with functional contacts that are 
mutually reinforced (sending and 
receiving e-mails, calling on the 
phone, professional meetings, etc.). 
Seeing and talking to civil servants 
occasionally at unplanned events does 
not qualify as a working relationship.
2 The ministry that is primarily 
responsible for tobacco control refers 
to the ministry that has jurisdiction 
in most fields of tobacco control. For 
example: in Germany, responsibility 
for most potential tobacco control 
measures resides in the Ministry 
of Consumer Protection, not in the 
Ministry of Health. The Ministry of 
Health cannot autonomously propose 
a bill.
□ Yes (1)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
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10. The partnership has a working 
relationship¹ with the minister (or 
secretary of state) who is primarily 
responsible for tobacco control², 
with functional contacts at least once 
in every 12 months.
1 Working relationships refer to 
professional relationships, with 
functional contacts that are mutually 
reinforced (sending and receiving 
e-mails, calling on the phone, 
professional meetings, etc.). Seeing 
and talking to the minister (or 
secretary of state) occasionally at 
unplanned events does not qualify as a 
working relationship.
2 The ministry that is primarily 
responsible for tobacco control refers 
to the ministry that has jurisdiction 
in most fields of tobacco control. For 
example: in Germany, responsibility 
for most potential tobacco control 
measures resides in the Ministry 
of Consumer Protection, not in the 
Ministry of Health. The Ministry of 
Health cannot autonomously propose 
a bill.
□ Yes (1)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
11. The partnership has working 
relationships¹ with at least 2 
journalists, with functional contacts 
at least once in every 6 months.
1 Working relationships refer to 
professional relationships, with 
functional contacts that are mutually 
reinforced (sending and receiving 
e-mails, calling on the phone, 
professional meetings, etc.).
□ Yes (1)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
12. The partnership has working 
relationships¹ with at least one 
tobacco control partnership in 
another country, with functional 
contacts at least once in every 6 
months.
1 Working relationships refer to 
professional relationships, with 
functional contacts that are mutually 
reinforced (sending and receiving 
e-mails, calling on the phone, 
professional meetings, etc.).
□ Yes (1)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
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Heterogeneity 13. The partnership includes the 
following types of organizations as 
formal partners¹ (multiple answers 
possible):
1 Formal partners refers to partners 
whose membership is laid down 
in a contract, a memorandum of 
understanding or similar documents.
□ Patient organizations (1)
□ Youth or family organizations (1)
□ Educational organizations (1)
□ Medical organizations (1)
□ Scientific organizations (1)
□ Sport organizations (1)
□ Municipalities (1)
□ Commercial companies (1)
Optional Comments:
Support base 14. The total number¹ of formal 
partners² is:
1 Total number refers to organizations 
counted at the highest possible level: 
for example, if an umbrella sports-
organization is a formal partner, 
the members of that umbrella 
organization are not counted 
individually.
2 Formal partners refers to partners 
whose membership is laid down 
in a contract, a memorandum of 
understanding or similar documents.
□ 1-4 (0.5)
□ 5-9 (1)
□ 10-14 (1.5)
□ 15-19 (2)
□ 20-29 (3)
□ 30-39 (4)
□ 40-49 (5)
□ 50-59 (6)
□ 60-69 (7)
□ 70-79 (8)
□ 80-89 (9)
□ 90-99 (10)
□ 100+ (11)
Optional Comments:
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15. The partnership has a reached 
agreement¹ that clearly defines the 
roles² and responsibilities³ of formal 
partners⁴.
1 Reached agreement refers to 
a reached agreement between 
coordinating bodies/persons and 
formal members (also: between formal 
members).
2 Roles refer to which tasks that 
formal members have, and the ways in 
which they are expected to contribute 
to reaching the objectives of the 
partnership.
3 Responsibilities refers to which 
specific domain the formal member 
covers. For example, it may be that the 
heart association takes responsibility 
to realize more smoke-free 
playgrounds.
4 Formal partners refers to partners 
whose membership is laid down 
in a contract, a memorandum of 
understanding or similar documents.
□ Yes (1)
□ More or less (0.5)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
Governance 16. The partnership has a central office¹ 
with staff dedicated² to coordination 
of the partnership.
1 Central office refers to an office with 
an actual address, with one or more 
(paid or unpaid) staff members.
2 Dedicated means that coordination 
of the partnership is part of the tasks 
of the staff.
□ Yes (1)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
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17. The partnership has a reached 
agreement¹ on how credits² are 
divided across formal partners³.
1 Reached agreement refers to 
a reached agreement between 
coordinating bodies/persons and 
formal members (also: between formal 
members).
2 Credits refer for example to public 
recognition of expertise and authority 
of individual partners, the efforts 
made by partners, and their public 
visibility.
3 Formal partners refers to partners 
whose membership is laid down 
in a contract, a memorandum of 
understanding or similar documents.
□ Yes (1)
□ More or less (0.5)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
Connecting 
person
18. The partnership includes one or 
more person(s) who is/are able 
to connect¹ and inspire² formal 
partners³, and moderate potential 
conflicts.
1 Connect refers to bringing formal 
partners into contact with each other.
2 Inspire refers to prompting formal 
partners to come up with innovative 
ideas, to dedicate resources and/or to 
undertake action.
3 Formal partners refers to partners 
whose membership is laid down 
in a contract, a memorandum of 
understanding or similar documents.
□ Yes (1)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
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Strategy 19. The partnership has a reached 
agreement¹ on the common goal² 
that is embraced by all formal 
partners³.
1 Reached agreement refers to 
a reached agreement between 
coordinating bodies/persons and 
formal members (also: between formal 
members).
2 Common goal refers to a common 
goal, agreed upon formal partners 
of the partnership, which may be 
aspirational (e.g. a tobacco-free 
generation or society) or more limited 
(e.g. complete protection of non-
smokers).
3 Formal partners refers to partners 
whose membership is laid down 
in a contract, a memorandum of 
understanding or similar documents.
□ Yes (1)
□ More or less (0.5)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
20. The partnership has a reached 
agreement¹ on a common strategy² 
that is embraced by all formal 
partners³.
1 Reached agreement refers to 
a reached agreement between 
coordinating bodies/persons and 
formal members (also: between formal 
members).
2 Common strategy refers to a 
common strategy, formulated by 
formal partners of the partnership, 
such as series of policy goals, or a 
roadmap, including an explicit strategy 
on how to achieve these goals.
3 Formal partners refers to partners 
whose membership is laid down 
in a contract, a memorandum of 
understanding or similar documents.
□ Yes (1)
□ More or less (0.5)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
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21. The partnership is able to formulate 
a shared public position¹ even on 
issues that may be subject to internal 
debate².
1 Shared public position refers 
to a publicly announced position 
(standpoint) on a certain issue, 
shared by all formal partners of the 
partnership.
2 Issues subject to debate refer 
to issues on which might cause 
disagreement between formal 
partners, for example regarding 
e-cigarettes or priority setting 
between alternative strategies.
□ Yes (1)
□ More or less (0.5)
□ No (0)
Optional Comments:
Conflict 
resolution
22. The partnership is able to avoid or 
resolve conflict¹ between formal 
partners².
1 Conflict refer to conflicts between 
partners for example with regards to 
public visibility, public recognition, 
funding, strategy line etc.
2 Formal partners refers to partners 
whose membership is laid down 
in a contract, a memorandum of 
understanding or similar documents.
□ Yes, always (1)
□ Yes, usually (0.5)
□ No, usually not (0)
□ No, never (0)
Optional Comments:
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